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I. NONRESIDENT TAXATION - THE PROBLEM
A. Nonresident Taxpayers Have No Protection from Aggressive State Taxing
Authorities
No one wants to pay taxes. Politicians have frequently been reminded
that taxation of constituents can be the cause of their political ruin.' Tax
administrators find more difficulty in enforcing taxes which are perceived as
harsh.2 One statement of the desired goal of any new tax, from a policy
viewpoint, has been presented as "plucking the goose as to obtain the largest
amount of feathers with the least possible amount of hissing."3
1. Tax increases and decreases have become dominant issues in political campaigns.
See, e.g., Gloria Borger, Don 'tFake Out the Voters, U.S.NEWS & WORLDREP., Nov. 15, 1993,
at 37; Ronald Brownstein, More Conflicts Likely in Era ofEmpty Pockets, L.A. TIMEs, July 18,
1991, at A5 (recalling that "[t]axes were a major issue in the defeat of all but one of the six
governors who lost reelection bids in 1990"); Eleanor Clift, Not the Year of the Women,
NEWSWEEK, Oct. 25, 1993, at 31; Richard S. Dunham, Clinton's Coattails Can't get Much
Shorter, Bus. WK. Nov. 15, 1993, at 47; Stephen Moore & Dean Stansel, The Great Tax Revolt
of 1994, REASON, Oct. 14, 1994, at 20 (detailing the wide variety of citizen initiated anti-tax
actions which swept the states in 1994); Robert Shogan, Rival's Bumbling Helps New Jersey's
Florio Make Comeback, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 10, 1993, at A5 (noting that a November 1991
"taxpayer revolt gave Republicans 'veto proof majorities in both houses of the legislature").
2. Enforcement becomes difficult when individuals, businesses, and other legislative
bodies undermine efforts to collect taxes. In a classic avoidance technique, individuals use flea
markets and garage sales to avoid paying sales taxes. See Matthew N. Murray, Would Tax
Evasion and Tax Avoidance Undermine a National Retail Sales Tax?, NAT'L TAX J., Mar.
1997, at 167, 172. Businesses also develop alternative plans to avoid or minimize taxes. For
example, "firms could aggressively market the use of electronic bulletin boards to link buyers
and sellers." Id. at 172.
3. PAULA. SAMUELSON& WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 785 (13th ed. 1989).
This quotation has been attributed to Jean Baptiste Colbert (1619-1683), the Finance Minister
of King Louis XIV of France. Although this philosophy did not specifically contribute to
Louis' downfall, it did contribute to the fall of the Bourbons in 1789. Huey Long put it into his
own words when he said "Don't tax you, don't tax me. Tax that fellow behind the tree." For
extensive history of this quote see William Safire, "On Language; Isn't it Rich, "NEW YORK
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Since any new tax imposed on constituents will create some distress, and
may create significant distress, legislators are always seeking taxes which will
generate the least reaction from constituents. The category of tax which best
fits this requirement is the tax laid upon those people who are not constituents.
Since non-constituents cannot vote against the legislator, and have little
opportunity to be heard in their complaint, these taxes can be very popular."
In many instances, the effect of the tax is relatively small with respect to
individual taxpayers, thus providing little incentive to complain or seek
redress. There is little constraint upon a state legislature when it enacts a tax
on non-constituents. At times, these legislatures become overly aggressive
and impose taxes upon nonresidents of their states which are offensive and
economically counterproductive.
B. The Courts Have Shown a Reluctance to Protect Nonresident Taxpayers
Some states have constitutional restrictions upon such taxes, but
generally, taxpayers' only recourse against a tax which is laid on them without
the benefit of complaint, is found in the Constitution of the United States.5
This article will summarize the types of taxes imposed by states and
municipalities upon nonresidents, and describe the constitutional bases for
challenges of these taxes. Additionally, the article will also consider and
analyze the availability to taxpayers of other remedies.
The available constitutional protections have, at times, proven
insufficient. Furthermore, the courts have typically taken a cavalier approach
to state taxation of nonresidents.6 Most courts grant legislators free reign over
taxation.7 But, at some point the taxation of nonresidents becomes excessive
TIMES, Nov. 11, 1990, § 6, at 22.
4. An excellent example of a tax which is not subject to complaint is the departure tax
imposed by many countries when a foreign visitor is leaving that country. The tax is usually
a small amount, between $15 and $25, so that it will not cause great distress, but will generate
significant income from a class that has no basis for challenging the tax. In addition, it does not
appear in the calculated costs of the trip, since it is not levied upon the airline ticket. See Janet
Piorko, For Car Renters, Bigger Tax Bites, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 2, 1997, § 5 (Magazine), at 4
(describing recent changes to the airport tax).
5. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, which guarantees equal protection of the law for
all person; see also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1, which protects the privileges and immunities
of citizens.
6. See, e.g., Lunding v. New York Tax Appleals Tribunal, 675 N.E.2d 816 (N.Y.
1996), rev'd, 522 U.S. 287 (1998).
7. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Tax Commission, 146 N.Y.S.2d 179 (App. Div. 1955).
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and needs to be restricted.' Therefore, it is imperative that new protections be
developed, or the current constitutional analyses be amended.
The U.S. Supreme Court recently decided Lunding v. Tax Appeals
Tribunal,9 a case involving taxation of nonresidents by New York State.
Following the New York Court of Appeals' decision upholding the
discriminatory taxation,'0 the Supreme Court reversed, holding New York's
practice unconstitutional." This case is useful to examine the issue of state
taxation of nonresidents and to develop a more modern test with respect to
discriminatory taxes imposed by one state upon the residents of another state.
C. Does the Constitution Guarantee Nonresidents Fair Treatment?
The basic underlying question posed in challenging taxation of
nonresidents by a state, is whether the U.S. Constitution guarantees each
citizen "fair" treatment by states other than the state of his residence. It is
clear that the state can tax nonresidents having sufficient nexus with that
state, 2 but in doing so, to what extent must fairness be maintained? Must a
state treat nonresidents in the same manner as residents? Is the nexus so
minimal as to include any act of engaging in commerce? Are nonresidents
fair game once they cross state lines? All of these questions appear to be
answered affirmatively by the courts. 3 Nonresidents appear to be both fair
game for heavy taxes, and an expanding target of legislatures.' 4 The reality
of living in the United States and earning a living is that multitudes of citizens
cross state lines to seek employment and carry on business. 5 All of these
people are affected when a state in which they engage in commerce taxes their
commerce at discriminatory rates. These taxes favor residents of the state to
the detriment of the nonresident. 6 They increase the costs of earning a living
for the nonresidents, and affect the cost of carrying on interstate business.
Overall, discriminatory taxes act as an economic drag on commerce. The
misguided goal of favoring residents over nonresidents can have economic
consequences for the individual state and for the entire country. While an
8. Travis v. Yale & Towne Manufacturing Co., 252 U.S. 60 (1920); see Lunding, 522
U.S. 287 (1998).
9. 522 U.S. 287 (1998).
10. See Lunding v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 675 N.E.2d 816 (N.Y. 1996).
11. See Lunding, 118 S.Ct at766.
12. See Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 52 (1919); see also Travis, 252 U.S. at 75.
13. See Shaffer, 252 U.S. at 52.
14. See id.
15. See Travis, 252 U.S. at 60.
16. See Shaffer, 252 U.S. at 37; Travis 252 U.S. at 60.
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effort is under way to decrease barriers to international trade, the exact
opposite is taking place as states are increasing their efforts to create new
taxes on nonresidents, and thereby hindering interstate trade.'
7
D. Types of Nonresident Taxation
In the United States there are two predominant situations in which
taxation of individual nonresidents presents problems: excessive taxation of
income earned in a state by nonresidents and excessive taxation of nonresident
travelers.' 8 States surrounding major cities such as New York, Philadelphia,
Washington, D.C., Chicago, and Portland, Oregon, are good examples of
metropolitan areas with a workforce derived from more than one state.19
Many citizens are residents of one state while earning all or a significant part
of their income in another state. States long ago received approval to tax
these nonresident earners.20 Some courts allow the state legislature to tax
these nonresidents at higher rates than residents. 2' This type of heavy taxation
of nonresident earners by states crosses the line of fairness. Not only is the
nonresident receiving far less in services from the taxing state, but they are
asked to pay a higher tax merely for the privilege of entering the state and
17. The creation of artificial economic barriers to interstate commerce in the form of
excess taxation discourages individuals and business from engaging in commerce in the taxing
state. This causes the costs of carrying on business to increase, and ultimately, costs are
increased for both local businesses and businesses in the affected state. See the discussion in
Sec. IV of this Article at page 35.
18. For example, nonresidents of New York are taxed at a rate which is equal to or
higher than residents of New York. These nonresidents use far fewer services of the state than
do residents. Although they do use services such as rapid transit and police protection, they are
not eligible for most social benefits that are available to residents. This imbalance in the use
of state services by nonresidents results in an imbalance whereby nonresidents are paying
significantly more tax to the state which does not provide them services than they pay to their
state of residence which provides their majority of services. When a taxpayer pays income
taxes to a state in which they work, the taxes paid to their resident state are reduced by credits.
Thus, the significant majority of their income tax payments are made to the nonresident state.
19. New York is intimately connected in commerce with Connecticut and New Jersey,
and to a smaller extent with Pennsylvania. Philadelphia is connected with New Jersey and
Delaware. Washington, D.C. is connected with Maryland and Virginia. Portland is connected
with Washington. Chicago is connected with Indiana and Wisconsin. See, e.g., Al Frank,
Planners Urge Hudson Tunnel: $3.5 Billion RailProject Called Vital to Region, STAR-LEDGER,
Dec. 29, 1997, at 3 (reporting that New Jersey residents currently comprise 13% of Manhattan's
work force of 2.3 million workers).
20. See Shaffer, 252 U.S. at 52.
21. See Lunding v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 675 N.E.2d 816,820 (N.Y. 1996), rev'd, 522
U.S. 287 (1998).
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earning their living.22 Certainly, a person may make the decision to pay a
higher tax rate in another state when they seek employment in the other state.
But, when the other state uses this opportunity to tax the nonresident at a
higher rate than the state taxes its own citizens earning the same wage, the
boundary of fairness is crossed. This increased tax burden is usually hidden
within a complex tax statute, making its existence very difficult to perceive.23
Travel, whether for business or pleasure is another significant source of
expenditures in states in which a citizen is a nonresident. This presents a
delicious opportunity for a state or municipality to impose a tax on a transient
who has stopped for so little time, that he or she is very unlikely to complain
or will merely treat the expenditure as a tax deductible business expense.
Taxes are imposed on those areas where a nonresident is most likely to
partake-hotels and rental cars.24 In order to further focus on the nonresident,
many states and municipalities exact an even higher tax on rental cars rented
at the airport.25 The sole recourse for the unfair taxation of nonresidents has
been the avoidance of the taxing state or city. The often quoted tax which
failed was a tax of twenty percent on hotel rooms by New York City. This tax
was ultimately rolled back to fifteen percent due to economic pressure, and
twenty percent is now perceived as a threshold which should not be crossed,
but only because of the economic deterrence.26
These two areas, disparate taxation of income of nonresidents and
excessive taxation on transients, appear to be the most common and expensive
methods of taxing nonresident individuals. 27 The use of excessive transient
taxes to raise funds for new local facilities has been a common trend.2' For
example, San Antonio, Texas imposed a very high tax on rental cars for the
22. The basis for taxing nonresidents' income has been that they are using some of the
services of the state in which the income is earned. However, nonresidents are generally using
far less of the services provided by the state in which the income is earned. A nonresident who
is employed in another state is not using the schools, the welfare system, or the courts. While
they place some demand on police and fire protection and can utilize other services such as
libraries, in the final analysis, the nonresident uses far less of the state's resources and
expenditures than its residents. In many states, the place where the income is earned determines
the (situs) for taxation, not the relationship of services used.
23. Anyone doubting the complexity of state taxation statutes need only look to New
York's tax laws. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 601. But, New York is typical of most states which
have drafted statutes with guidance only from their administrative tax offices.
24. See Piorko, supra note 4, at 4.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. Other significant sources of tax by local governments are real property taxes,
personal property taxes, estate taxes and sales taxes. These are focused upon residents.
28. See Mike Monroe, Spurs' Plan for Dynasty A Bit Shaky, DENVER POST, Oct. 10,
1999, at C4.
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purpose of funding a new stadium in order to attract a professional football
team to the area.29
Taxation of nonresidents takes many forms. Some types of non-
constituent taxation is overt, but many types are imposed in such a manner
that they are less apparent and more likely to escape notice. "Covert" would
be a good description. These taxes are the result of centuries of thought given
to new revenue sources for governments. The clearest form of nonresident
taxation is the income tax exacted by some states and cities on nonresidents
of those governmental areas.3" This taxation in itself is not necessarily wrong,
but may become prohibited if it is enforced in a manner which discriminates
against the nonresident.3' The rationale is that because nonresidents use
emergency services, transportation, roads, etc., the costs should be shared.32
However, in the case of commuters, the services used are often much less than
the taxes paid.33 Commuters certainly use some services, but usually far less
than those used by residents.
The simplest question to be answered in the taxation of nonresidents is
what the basis for taxation can be. It is clear that nonresidents use fewer
governmental services than residents. If the tax is laid upon income, should
all income of a nonresident be taxed, or only the income derived from within
the taxing body's boundaries? It is not necessary that the tax burden be
apportioned on the nonresident in proportion to the use of governmental
services, but it should be based upon some reasonable rationale. Generally,
states tax the entire amount of income earned by a nonresident within the
state.34 Because of this, a person must allocate their income to the various
states in which it is earned, and pay taxes to each of these states. For
example, when a professional football player plays sixteen games in a season,
eight of which are out of state, his salary is allocated by one-sixteenth to each
state based on the games played in that state, so that nine returns and nine
state taxes would be paid.
29. See id.
30. See Travis, 252 U.S. at 60.
31. See Lunding, 522 U.S. 287 (1998).
32. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920) (the court believed that income taxes
on nonresidents were a valid method of defraying government expenses).
33. A taxpayer will generally use the majority of government services in the place
where she lives. Police, fire, highways, schools, and social services are used mostly in the place
of residence, while a commuter will use only some of the police, fire, highway and rapid transit
services used in the place of residence.
34. See Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920).
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E. Nonresident Taxes Used to Pay for Specific Projects
The possibility that the Yankees will move from the Bronx to a new $1
billion stadium on Manhattan's West Side is only one chapter in a nationwide
drama that might be best described as "Stadium Mania."" In every major
sport, owners are asking for, and often receiving, new stadiums and arenas to
finance their income, player salaries, loans to buy their teams and estate
plans.36
The wave of construction has spurred a heated public debate: Should
millionaire owners coping with the high cost of business reach into their own
pockets to build luxurious sports places? Or, should state and local
governments pay for such places in order to keep the team in town or attract
a team from another city? When the local populace is not enamored with the
idea of supporting a wealthy owner for the sake of keeping a major league
sports franchise, legislatures look to nonresident sources of income in the
form of taxes.37
The New York Times has had a continuing series of articles detailing the
struggles occurring between sports teams and the cities where they currently
play.3" The following incorporates many of the findings in those articles.
Owners argue that there is a great economic value to the municipality in
supporting a professional team.39 Some typical rationales used by owners are
often repeated.
"You don't measure sports teams just in dollars and cents," said Peter Karmanos, who
last month moved his hockey team, the Hartford Whalers, to North Carolina. "You
measure it in cultural spirit. Ask people in Hartford what they think it means to the
city when they lost the team, or in Minneapolis-St. Paul. Ask if they'd reconsider
subsidizing a team to come back there."
"Opponents say that subsidies, such as broad-based sales taxes, constitute
corporate welfare, mocking the public's need to pay for essential services. In
35. See Richard Sandomir, Never Mind Titles, Teams Clamor for New Stadiums, N.Y.
TiMES, June 4, 1997, at B9.
36. See id.
37. See Piorko, supra note 4, at 4; Sandomir, supra note 35, at B9.
38. See Sandomir, supra note 35, at B9.
39. See id.
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addition, many studies show that there is little economic gain from these kinds of
projects, and that spending on stadiums merely diverts spending from other areas.4"
Still others believe that this use of taxpayer money is not the most beneficial
expenditure for the community. There is much disagreement as to the
community benefits.4'
Still, a hodgepodge of public and private financial resources make up the construction
plans of 44 professional teams (spread over the four major sports) that are seeking.
. or building new stadiums or arenas. The list includes two arenas in Miami and
possibly two in Los Angeles, plus two stadiums in Cincinnati, Detroit, Seattle and
San Francisco. But it excludes a stadium being built for the Browns in Cleveland,
and one proposed for the Coliseum's site in Los Angeles, which has lost two football
teams since 1995.
In New York, besides the Yankees' desire for a new stadium, the Mets are
planning a retractable domed stadium on a site opposite Shea Stadium, for which they
may ask government aid. The Islanders are also looking for a new arena to replace
the aging Nassau Coliseum, with help from [Nassau] County.
Each referendum is, in a way, a plebiscite on how far governments should go
to help finance stadiums and arenas for privately owned teams. Owners say they
merit public subsidies because of the intangible psychological benefits of being a
major league town and the economic advantages that teams generate. They wield the
ultimate hammer, leaving town, which can bring a vulnerable city to its knees . 42
40. Id. See Professional Sports: The Challenges Facing the Future of the Industry:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 55 (1996); Antitrust Issues
in Relocation of Professional Sports Franchises: Hearings on S.500 Before the Subcomm. on
the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 113 (1995).
41. See generally, Daniel J. Lathrope, Federal Tax Policy, Tax Subsidies, and the
Financing of Professional Sports Facilities, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 1147 (1997) (discussing the
fallacies of the economic justifications typically presented by proponents of state and local
subsidies for professional sports facilities). "'Once you take taxes to pay for a stadium or arena,
you can't spend it somewhere else ... Stadium construction creates no real wealth. It just
transfers it."' Sandomir, supra note 35, at B9.
42. Sandomir, supra note 35, at B9. See Katherine C. Lleone, No Team, No peace:
Franchise Free Agency in the National Football League, 97 COLuM. L. REV., 473, 476, 489,
n. 120 (1997); Matthew Mitten & Bruce Burton, Professional Sports Franchise Relocations
from Private Law and Public Perspectives: Balancing Marketplace Competition, League
Autonomy, and the Needfor a Level Playing Field, 56 MD. L. REV. 57,97 n.208 (1997); Sanjay
Jose' Mullick, Browns to Baltimore: Franchise Free Agency and the New Economics of the
NFL, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 1, 19, 22 (1996); Around the Majors, WASH. POST., Oct 27, 1997,
at D3; Dan Barry, Feverish Dreams of Baseball as Mets Look at Brooklyn, N.Y. TIMES, Jan 17,
1998, at B3; Dan McGraw, Playing the Stadium Game, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 3,
1996, at 46; Phil Mintz & Denise Flaim, The LI Look: A Landscape Full of Shining Stars and
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A San Francisco group interested in building a new stadium to be home
to the 49ers "wanted the city to issue $100 million in bonds."43 The team and
city presented studies to show that taxes generated by the complex would pay
the project's debt. The investors stated that they would buy insurance to
guarantee payments."
"It's not viable," said Andrew Zimbalist, an economics professor at Smith College.
"The incremental revenues from the mall and stadium won't pay the debt service."
He said the city's estimate of $6.1 million in yearly debt payments-to be repaid with
sales taxes-should be raised to $10 million...
In Seattle, the question of whether Paul Allen, whose Microsoft stock is worth
$12.4 billion, deserves help from the public, is frequently heard.
Concrete Chaos, NEWSDAY, Oct 12, 1997, at 37; Michael K. Ozanian, Suite Deals: Inside the
Built Cleveland Boom, FIN. WORLD, May 9, 1995, at 50; Richard Sandomir, How Compromise
Built Cleveland a New Stadium, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 12, 1996, at C4.
Sandomir goes on to describe the situation:
From the Ball Park To the Ballot Box
The stadium and arena action accelerates almost daily: Columbus, Ohio, voters reject
a tax increase for an arena and a soccer stadium. The Whalers pay Connecticut $20.5
million over 15 years to become the Carolina Hurricanes. The Minnesota Twins
threaten to leave the Metrodome. The Cincinnati Bengals sign a lease through 2026
for stadium paid for mostly with a half-cent sales tax.
"It's a renaissance," said Jerry Bell, the president of the Twins. But not for the
Twins, at least not yet. The State Legislature has not enacted any measures to finance
a new ball park, or even bit at an offer by the owner Carl Pohlad to trade the state 49
percent interest in the team for financial backing. And the Twins are not alone in
seeking public aid:
A referendum was being voted on in San Francisco to decide whether to approve
$100 Million in public funds for a $525 million 49ers stadium and entertainment
complex at Candlestick Point.
... Seattle voters will be asked to approve a $300 million package of financial aid for
construction of a $425 million Seahawks stadium in an election that has been
financed, with the approval of the Washington State Legislature, by Paul G. Allen,
the Microsoft billionaire.
The Pittsburgh Steelers and the Pirates, uneasy partners at the 26-year-old Three
Rivers Stadium, are the month to put a referendum to build two stadium on a
November ballot. The financing includes a 10-county sales tax increase.
Sandomire, supra note 35, at B9.
43. Sandomir, supra note 35, at B9.
44. See id.
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"Remember, Paul Allen was coaxed into this," said Bob Gogerty, a campaign
consultant to Allen. "This is a team whose owner was going to move the team in a
van and Paul picked up the option." He's saying, "I'll be a part of this."
But skepticism persists. In 1995, voters spurned a referendum providing
financing for a $320 million Mariners ball park, then watched the Washington
Legislature retool the measure and pass it...
In Columbus, Ohio, a referendum to impose a three-year, half-cent sales tax
increase to help finance a $285 million soccer stadium-arena venture failed, hurting
a downtown revitalization effort. The referendum was defeated partly by voters not
wanting a new tax or not believing the tax would end in three years.
Still, each city's situation is different; many do not use referendums, others
want to enhance their reputations by getting a team, regardless of municipal fiscal
woes. Team situations differ, too. Are voters being asked to say "yes" to a tax or a
lottery to lure a team? Or help a beloved one? Is the team in first place? Or last?
... [P]assing referendums depends on how they are marketed and explained.
Public money will most likely remain a key element of most stadium and arena
construction. But Marc Ganis, president of Sportscorp, a consulting firm, said public
money is risky. "You add significant cost because the public doesn't build things
efficiently," he said. "If a project goes over cost, everyone knows politicians will find
extra money.""'
In Illinois, a departure tax on airport flights was implemented to pay for
construction of McCormick Place, a convention center. 6 When the tax was
challenged, the Illinois courts upheld the tax because the tax bore a
"reasonable relationship" to the object of the legislation. 47 The fact that it
tended to fall on nonresidents did not affect their decision.41 Similarly, a
Pennsylvania court upheld a hotel tax to pay for a new convention center.49
The perception of local authorities and the courts has been that these
"foreigners," the nonresidents, are using the facility and therefore should pay
for it. However, the real economic benefit is to the local community, in the
form of employment opportunities and increased economic activity. The
45. Id.
46. See Terry v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Auth., 648 N.E.2d 1047 (Iil. App. Ct.
1995).
47. See Terry, 648 N.E.2d at 1054.
48. See id.
49. See Torbik v. Luzerne County, 696 A.2d 1141, 1149 (Pa. 1997); Leventhal v. City
of Philadelphia, 542 A.2d 1328 (Pa. 1988).
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actual rationale for building these facilities is to benefit the local population,
maybe at the cost of nonresidents5 0 Clearly, the economic decision to build
or not build a new facility, is made with respect to the economic gains to
residents of the state or municipality, not the gain to nonresidents who may
attend the facility. It is deceiving to attempt to justify these taxes on
nonresidents as being for their benefit.
F. Income Taxes
Most states impose some form of taxation on the income of individuals.
The basis for the taxation is the income attributable to the state. When a
person lives in one state, but earns income in another, both states will tax the
person's income. Generally, the income can be allocated to the state where
it was earned, and it will be subject to income taxation in that state."
Therefore, a citizen would have to allocate his or her income to each state and
pay the tax accordingly to the proper state. If a person is a resident of State
A and earns income in State B, State B would tax what is termed the
individual's State B source income-income derived in State B. Source income
includes salaries earned in that state, partnership income from a partnership
doing business in that state, investments held in that state, real estate income
earned in that state, business income from a business in that state or income
earned by a performer or athlete from activities in that state. An individual's
first step is to allocate his or her income between the various states in which
activities are carried on or investments made. The next issue involves the
proper allocation of deductions to the various states.2 For example, if a state
grants a personal exemption for dependents, how should these be used to
reduce income from each state? Most states apply a percentage to the
deductions.53 The percentage is the percentage of total income attributable to
the individual state.54 This percentage is then applied to the allowable
50. Since it is politically unpopular to pay for new facilities with taxes on voting
residents, the tax should be shifted to nonresidents. The facility generates tax revenue for the
residents because it brings in new sources of sales tax.
51. See, e.g., N.Y. TAX LAW § 631(a)(1) (McKinney 1987); MICHIGAN STATUTES
ANNOTATED § 7.557 (130)(5)(1967).
52. As an example of the allocation of income, income from athletes and entertainers
is subjected to income tax in the state in which it is earned. For example, a member of the
Dallas Cowboy Football team who plays one game in Massachusetts, is taxed on one-sixteenth
of his salary by Massachusetts. This is based on the salary being earned over a sixteen game
season. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 63 1(b)(3) (McKinney 1987).
53. See id.
54. See id.
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deductions." In theory, an individual would have 100% of the deductions
when allocated against the numerous states. However, in practice, since the
size and availability of deductions varies from state to state, the actual
percentage could be less than 100%.
II. WHAT IS "FAIR TREATMENT"?
The question of what fairness is guaranteed to nonresidents, is not a simple
one. Most taxes are not structured merely to impose a higher tax on the'
nonresidents, but carry some other underlying rationale. 6 However, some
taxes are simply imposed with the goal of collecting substantial sums from a
group of non-constituents. 7 The sole reason for these taxes is that the paying
group is made up of non-constituents that are unlikely to complain. Under the
current system of legal application, only economic pressures can limit the
imposition of these taxes. This paper will explore the provisions of the U.S.
Constitution, their application to non-constituents taxation, their guarantee of
fairness, and the definitions of fairness. "Fairness" when applied to the
taxation by a state of nonresidents should provide that nonresidents are treated
the same as residents. There are certain instances where the state has an
interest in taxing non residents, but the trend in state taxation has been to shift
as much burden as possible to nonresidents. Once this path is taken, it can
lead to ever greater shifts. In fact, with increasing pressure to lower or not
increase taxes on residents, legislatures have increasingly moved their focus
to nonresidents. This places an increasing burden on interstate commerce, and
can result in economic imbalances. The state courts have not been the proper
place for a taxpayer to seek redress for these taxes. Many cases have been
brought by newly burdened businesses-hotels and rental car agencies.
However, for most of these taxes, there is no natural constituency to protect
the interest of the nonresident taxpayer. In some instances, the effect of the
tax on an individual taxpayer makes the costs of litigating the issue too
burdensome for an individual to undertake. Even in cases with very expensive
taxes, the only taxpayer to challenge the constitutionality of a discriminatory
55. See id.
56. For example, N. Y. TAX LAW § 631 (b)(6) denies a deduction for alimony paid by
a nonresident while allowing such deductions to a resident. The rationale is stated that the
nonresident's paying this alimony is not related to New York income. See Lunding, 118 S. Ct.
at 752.
57. The 18% tax on rental cars at O'Hare airport in Chicago is a prime example of such
action.
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statue have been lawyers suing on their own behalf"8 This indicates that
"fairness" is not something the average person affected by nonresident
taxation can afford to challenge. Since some states provide a tax court to hear
issues, it would appear that a taxpayer would have a reasonable recourse. But,
since these tax courts do not have jurisdiction over constitutional challenges,
any real challenge must be played out in the state courts at great expense.
Too often, the state courts have given very little protection to
nonresidents. They seem to have a little interest in protecting the rights of
nonresidents. Consequently, the federal courts are the most likely place for
a nonresident to successfully challenge an unfair tax. The federal courts need
to set forth a test to stem the aggressive proliferation of the taxation of
nonresidents by states. The U.S. Supreme Court recently decided a case
involving the unfair taxation of a resident of Connecticut by the State of New
York.59 This is the proper venue for the federal government to reinforce the
constitutional provisions guaranteeing fair treatment by a state of the citizens
of another state. The lack of protection from state courts and the aggressive
imposition of taxes on nonresidents is exactly the problem that the "privileges
and immunities" clause of the U.S. Constitution was meant to avoid.
Unfair taxation should be broadly defined to include any tax which has
the practical effect of being targeted predominantly at nonresidents or any tax
which has the practical effect of taxing nonresidents at a higher rate than
residents without any rationale related to a specific extra cost imposed on the
taxing state. These taxes should be violative of constitutional protection
unless there is some specific rational for the taxing state to require higher
revenues when dealing with nonresidents. Currently, the message given by
many states is that if you enter my state for purposes of earning a living, you
must prepare to pay more for that privilege than if you were a resident of that
state. It is time that fair treatment of nonresident taxpayers be required of
states.
III. THREE POSSIBLE REMEDIES FOR UNFAIR TAXATION
Currently, there are three possible remedies available to nonresidents
subjected to what they perceive to be an unfair tax. Nonresidents can (1) look
to the legislature to reduce or eliminate the tax; (2) bring suit in the hope that
the judiciary will provide the protection of the equal protection clause and the
58. See Lunding v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 675 N.E.2d 816 (N.Y. 1996), cert. granted,
117 S. Ct. 1817 (1997), rev'd, 522 U.S. 287 (1998); Goodwin v. State Tax Comm'n, 146
N.Y.S.2d 172, 174 (1955), aff'd, I N.Y.2d 680 (1956); Wood v. Department of Revenue, 749
P.2d 1169 (Or. 1988).
59. See Lunding, 118 S. Ct. at 766.
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privileges and immunities clause; and (3) demonstrate to the taxing state that
nonresident taxation actually causes economic harm to the taxing state. The
first possible remedy is unlikely to be effective, unless the group is large
enough to create some pressure on legislators. But, since the legislators do
not answer in any way to a nonresident, they are generally unresponsive. The
second possible remedy is also unlikely because courts have rarely used
constitutional protections to invalidate taxes on nonresidents." At best, the
attitudes of the courts have been indifference.
The third available remedy, economic deterrence, has been the only
useful tool, for nonresidents looking for relief from unfair taxation.6
However, because it usually requires the activity of an organized group, it has
rarely been successful. The economic deterrence occurs when a significant
effect results from the imposition of an unfair tax. First, the tax must be
higher than what is normally expected, and it must cause a change in
consumer's behavior to the extent that a local group becomes interested and
to an extent that the legislature takes action. A good example of this occurred
when New York City imposed a hotel tax on luxury hotel rooms of twenty-
one percent.62 This tax was perceived to result in a decrease in room
utilization-causing lost profits for the hotels.63 It became apparent to the
hoteliers from the loss of convention bookings.'M Conventions are planned
and booked by people with negotiating power who can complain of high
costs. 65 More importantly, they have the ability to move large segments of
business away from the high cost area. This occurred in New York, and the
resulting economic pressure caused the hotel tax to be lowered.M However,
in many instances, the groups affected do not have the economic effectiveness
to bring about such a reduction.
A. Voting Disapproval: Attack the Legislative Source
A legislature has the ultimate power to levy a tax on any citizen. As a
matter of legislative conduct and constitutional theory, legislatures have been
60. See Goodwin, 146 N.Y.S.2d 172; see Lunding, 675 N.E 2d at 816.
61. See, e.g., Betsey Wade, Tax Collectors Lean on Out of Towners, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
25, 1991, at B3; Daniel Savirp, An Economic andPolitical Look at Federalism in Taxarion, 90
MICH. L. REv. 895 (1992).
62. See Kirk Johnson, What saved the Hotels? Notjust Tax Cuts, N.Y. TIMEs, July 30,
1997, at BI.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See Johnson, supra note 62.
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given broad power to tax.6 7 There are only two controls on this power within
the legal system.68 The electorate can refuse to elect the politicians,69 and the
judiciary can apply constitutional protections against the tax. A non-
constituent does not have the availability of the first control-refusing to elect
the legislator. In addition, courts have been reluctant to protect nonresidents
against unfair taxation.70  The ability of taxpayers to avoid nonresident
taxation depends upon their ability to avoid contact with the taxing state.
This, however, is not a possibility for many people. The ultimate resolution
of this problem lies in the economic realities of the situation. A citizen
working in another state, and paying higher taxes, is likely making the
decision to pay the higher tax based upon the ability to earn a higher income
in the other state. If this higher earning ability diminishes, then the incentive
disappears. There is a natural force at work in this context. If a state is taxing
at a higher rate than other states, its employers must pay premium labor rates
to induce nonresidents to enter its market place. This raises the marginal cost
of business, and encourages employers to move. This effect is higher in states
which have major employment centers near the borders of neighboring
heavily populated states.7 In a city which is remote from state borders there
is little or no effect.72 When a non-constituent has no economic power or
choice, he or she is at the mercy of the other taxing authority.
Another aspect of the powerlessness of a non-constituent is that in good
economic times, the economic pressures are not felt by states as strongly as
67. See Lunding, 675 N.E.2d at 819; Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656,661-62
(1975); Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 359 (1973); Madden v.
Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940).
68. See Leo Martinez, Taxes, Morals and Legitimacy, 1994 BYU L. REV. 521 (1994).
69. Probably the foremost issue in any political campaign now is the candidate's record
on raising or lowering taxes. A number of political losses have been attributed to the raising
of taxes on the electorate. See George F. Will, The Politics of Discomfort Levels, NEWSWEEK,
Nov. 1, 1993, at 80.
70. See Lunding, 675 N.E.2d at 819.
71. Where the cost of a move is relatively low, just a few miles into another state,
employers can easily move their business to take advantage of the cheaper costs of labor.
Existing employees would incur no greater tax by moving to the new location. There may be
some increased commutation costs for existing employees. Each new employee costs less in
the new location than in the old. An employee who would work for $10 per hour in his own
state would require $10 plus increase in tax to work in the higher taxing state. Thus, the
employer could pay the same employees less for the same work, and the employee would be
in an even position.
72. Where the additional cost to move because of a remote location would be high, the
incentive to move would be much lower. Existing employees would be reluctant to move
because of the relocation involved.
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when economic times are bad.73 Thus, the loss of some visitors or employees
is not readily apparent. When economic growth is slow or non-existent, states
are more likely to react to complaints of groups or to the economic
dislocations caused by excessive taxes. When state coffers are filled, and
business is booming, the negative effects of over taxation are masked by
general economic good. The fact that some conventions are bypassing a state
or city are less likely to be noticed, because others step in to fill the empty
space. In the current economic climate, the economic power of non-
constituents is unlikely to be effectively heard.
B. Judiciary: Constitutional Protection
Some states have become too aggressive in taxing non-residents-treating
them worse than residents. There are two main issues to be decided in
determining whether a statute taxing nonresidents violates constitutional
protections. First, does the constitution require equal treatment of
nonresidents and residents? Second, how is equal treatment defined?
The equal treatment requirement could be found in any of three
provisions of the Constitution, the Commerce Clause,7 4 the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,75 or the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Fourteen Amendment.76
1. Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause provides that states may not interfere with the
flow of commerce between states." In the area of taxation, courts have
interpreted this to mean that a state may not give advantages to its own
citizens at the expense of non-citizens. However, not all discrimination
against outsiders will be found to be unconstitutional. If there is a sufficient
rationale for the state to enact a discriminatory tax, and if the burden on the
outsiders is not too great, the statute has been held constitutional. 8
Discriminatory taxes have been permitted when the burden placed on the
73. When employment is high, income tax receipt of states increase substantially.
When employment is low, the receipts decrease and place pressure upon governments to cut
programs and to raise taxes. See, e.g., Jackie Calmes, Tax Revenues May Continue Recent
Surge, WALL STREET JOURNAL, MAY 1, 1997, at A3.
74. See U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 3.
75. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
76. See id.
77. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
78. See Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 265 (1989); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of
Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 128 (1978).
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citizens of other states is only to serve the purpose of increasing services to
the citizens of the state, and to provide a strong market for the local
businesses.79 If the taxpayers from other states have a credit from their state
for this tax, then there is said to be no burden on those taxpayers."0 The
Commerce Clause is used to prohibit any state from interfering with
commerce or impeding the operation of businesses on an interstate basis.8 To
avoid this prohibition, the rationale for a tax is that the tax only increases a
burden on a business choosing to do business within the state. It does not
impose any restriction or burden on the business doing business in any other
state. This tax is only imposed upon businesses doing business within the
taxing state and on the business done within the state. Therefore, it is believed
that the tax is only imposed on "intrastate commerce," not "interstate
commerce. 82 If it imposed a higher tax on business done over state borders,
it would be considered interstate commerce. 3
Under Goldberg v. Sweet,"4 the Court upheld a tax in which the burden
fell solely upon the resident of the state. 5 In this case the increased tax fell
only upon the residents of the state, thus it was not impermissible. 6 The
residents were not of the disenfranchised class who could not complain.
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady87 stated the following four pronged test:
a state tax will withstand scrutiny under the Commerce Clause if (1) the tax
is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus to the taxing state,(2) the tax
is fairly apportioned, (3) the tax does not discriminate against interstate
commerce, and (4) the tax is fairly related to the services provided by the
state.8 Under Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission,8 9 it appears
that a tax may not cause a discriminating burden on activities which take place
someplace else, such as goods manufactured outside the state, or transactions
which take place outside the state. 9° However, when the tax is imposed only
on transactions taking place within the state, the state has been allowed to tax
79. See Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 252.
80. See, e.g., Clark v. Lee, 406 N.E.2d 646 (Ind. 1980).
81. See Cheney Bros. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 147 (1918).
82. See Maine v. Grand Trucking Railway, 142 U.S. 217 (1891).
83. See Cheney Bros., 246 U.S. at 153. See Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656
(1975).
84. 488 U.S. 252 (1989).
85. See Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 252.
86. See id. at 266.
87. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
88. See Brady, 430 U. S. at 279.
89. 368 N.E.2d 284 (N.Y. 1977).
90. See Boston Stock Exch., 368 N.E.2d at 284.
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such activity.9 Since the activity which is taxed takes place within the state,
the burdens on the state regulatory body are increased, because of the need for
regulation to protect consumers.92 In addition, the cost of regulating
nonresident businesses, and the cost of enforcing claims against nonresident
businesses, will be higher than for resident businesses.93 Foreclosure and
litigation costs, will be higher, collection of fees and fines will be more
difficult, and consumer reporting costs will increase. This tax is operating as
a subsidy to the local banks. It is not intended as a discriminatory tax. It has
the effect of encouraging local banks, and of recovering the extra cost
involved in regulating out of state banks doing business within the state. A
similar analysis can be applied to discriminatory taxation of nonresident
citizens.
2. Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause guarantees all persons the equal protection
of the laws.94 This clause does not prohibit all discrimination in tax statutes.
It requires that any tax which discriminates against nonresidents be based
upon a rational basis and not resort to arbitrary classifications.9  In
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. "v. Ward,96 the Supreme Court looked at
whether a state could use a tax differential to encourage capital investment
within the state. 97 Alabama enacted a tax which was three to four times as
high as the tax on resident insurance companies." The Court found that the
excessive tax was not rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. 99 The
Court went on to find that this tax actually penalized foreign insurers.I" ° It
was effectively a barrier for out of state insurance companies, not a rational
tax discrimination.' The difference in allowable cases is that the tax has a
rational relationship to the extra burdens placed on the state regulatory
bodies.0 2 It is not so great as to form a barrier to doing business in the
91. See Pullman's Palace Car v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891).
92. See Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
93. See id.
94. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
95. See Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528 (1959).
96. 470 U.S. 869 (1994).
97. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 470 U.S. at 883.
98. See id. at 871.
99. See id. at 880.
100. See id. at 878.
101. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 470 U.S. at 882-83.
102. See id. at 881.
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state. 1 3  In Western and Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Board of
Equalization,04 a tax which promoted the insurance business in California was
upheld by the Court. °5 The Court, in Metropolitan Life distinguished this
case by noting that the sole purpose in Metropolitan Life was to favor local
insurance companies, no matter what the cost to nonresident companies.' °6
The major difference was the size and effect of the discrimination, not the
simple existence of discrimination.
3. Privileges and Immunities
Imbedded in the Constitution of the United States are two clauses
protecting the privileges and immunities of "citizens." Article IV Section 2,
commonly known as the Privileges and Immunities Clause provides: "The
Citizen of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of
citizens in the several States."'0 7 This Clause was part of the Constitution as
originally adopted.
Following the Civil War, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. Section One of that Amendment
provides: "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States." It is well settled
that corporations cannot invoke the protection of either of these constitutional
guarantees.' 9 Both privileges and immunities clauses by their express terms
afford protection only to "citizens," and corporations are not regarded by the
Court as citizens for purposes of standing under either clause. 0
The effect of discrimination in law against citizens of another state may
be large or small, but it is never positive; its negative effect can be amplified
by the creation of a new source of interstate tension. Each unjustified
discrimination against a citizen of a sister state is a constitutional wrong to
that citizen.
There are general constitutional values of national unity and equal
treatment of individual citizens. These values must be read, "Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens" as referring to all the ways in which citizens are
103. See id. at 879-80.
104. 451 U.S. 648 (1981).
105. See Western & S. Life Ins. Co., 451 U.S. at 650-52.
106. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 470 U.S. at 877.
107. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl.1.
108. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
109. See Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985).
110. See Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537 (1928); Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239
(1898); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1868).
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treated by the state. The scope of the clause is co-extensive with the scope of
interaction, between states and citizens."' One of these interactions is to
allocate taxation between citizens of different states, and to choose the law
that taxes such citizens.
The Supreme Court had defined "Privileges and Immunities" as a term
of art not limited to certain categories of rights." 2 It has limited the scope of
the term by saying that it includes only those rights of citizens that are
"fundamental." ' Fundamental in this definition appears to mean merely
"important," or "not insignificant." A right can be fundamental for privileges
and immunities purposes even though it is not a fundamental right. It is
fundamental because a compelling interest would be required to override it for
citizens and non-citizens alike. Thus, all the rights of trade, commerce, and
pursuit of a livelihood are fundamental rights for this purpose. These
economic rights get strong interstate equality protection, even though the
Constitution gives them almost no substantive protection. " 4 It would appear
that these rights include the taxes imposed on a nonresident citizen who is
engaged in commerce in another state.
In taxation, the Privileges and Immunities Clause is where taxpayers find
protection again discriminatory taxes levied by states in which they are
nonresidents."' They have no voting voice in those states. The "fairness"
which nonresident taxpayers must receive from other states is guaranteed by
the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The Clause must be upheld by federal
courts in providing the constitutional guarantee of fairness in treatment from
other states. Without such an interpretation, the nonresident is "fair game"
for the taxing state. This discriminatory taxation leads to border wars. If one
state treats the citizens of another state in an unfair manner, the response of
the other states has been to enact retaliatory taxes." 6 This results in economic
111. See Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. 418,430(1970) (stating that "beyond a doubt those
works are very comprehensive in meaning."); see also Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180 (1868)
(stating that "it secures to them in other States the equal protection of their laws").
112. See Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm., 436 U.S. 371, 387 (1978).
113. See id. at 387-88.
114. Compare Supreme Court v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 279-83 (1985), and Hicklin v.
Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 523-34 (1978) (protecting nonresidents' right to pursue an occupation
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV), with Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S.
726 (1963), and Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 484-89 (1955), and
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 59-60, 76-78 (1872)(rejecting residents' claim of
Fourteenth Amendment right to pursue an occupation).
115. See, e.g., Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. at 430 (1870); see Toomer v. Witsell, 334
U.S. 385 (1948).
116. This scenario is exactly what occured in New Jersey, and New York in 1955
through 1961. See Goodwin v. State Tax Comm'n, 146 N.Y.S.2d 172, 174 (1955), affd, 133
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inefficiencies and barriers to work and trade. This is the exact problem that
the Privileges and Immunities Clause should be used to avoid. The Clause
should be interpreted to abolish the discriminatory taxation of nonresidents in
a very broad sense.
It has been a mistake to limit the Clause to fundamental rights, even if
the limitation is rarely invoked. Much of the writing and analysis of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause has been with regard to "choice of law"
issues. This has been result of a number of cases arising in the area, and the
constant conflict involving adjacent states. Both critics and supporters of
interest analysis have agreed that this limitation is irrelevant to choice of
law.1 7 To receive equal justice in the courts, to be governed by equal
application of equal laws, to be treated fairly by other states, is at the core of
our government's system. Equal treatment in the courts was a central part of
the Founders' understanding of privileges and immunities; the Privileges and
Immunities Clause was closely linked to diversityjurisdiction.'" There is one
other possible interpretation of privileges and immunities. In 1787, the term
carried a sense of civil rights as distinguished from political rights. The
Privileges and Immunities Clause does not mean that visitors from sister
states can vote in local elections or hold local office." 9 These rights are not
privileges and immunities at all.
a. The Standard of Review
Douglas Laycock has analyzed the attempt to undermine the Privileges
and Immunities Clause utilizing a lower standard of review. The standard of
review is independent of the scope of the Clause. Within its scope-with
respect to whatever "privileges and immunities" it applies to-the Clause is
written in absolute terms. States are not merely to refrain form "irrational" or
"inefficient"'20 discrimination, or to treat citizens of sister states "reasonably
equally," or equally except where there is some reason to discriminate, or
even some "substantial" reason to discriminate. Rather, Laylock believes that
the Clause says without qualification that states are to treat citizens of sister
N.E. 2d 711 (1956); Michael Solomon, Nonresident Personal Income Tax: A Comparative
Study in Eight States, 29 FORDHAM L. REV. 105 (1961); see also NONRESIDENT TAX STUDY
COMMITTEE, REPORT ON TAXATION OF NONRESIDENT BY NEW YORK 48 (1959).
117. See John Hart Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in Protecting Its Own,
23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 173, 182-83 (1981); see also Larry Kramer, The Myth of the
"Unprovided-For" Case, 75 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1067 n.71 (1989).
118. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; see also Douglas Laycock, Equality and the
Citizens ofSister States, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 431, 433-36 (1987).
119. See Laycock, supra note 122, at 433-36.
120. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; see also Laycock, supra note 122, at 445.
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states as citizens.' This should mean that the tax burden imposed on those
citizens should not be greater than the burden imposed upon citizens of the
taxing state.
The narrow focus of the Privileges and Immunities Clause is also
relevant to the standard of review, sharply distinguishing this clause from the
general guarantee of equality in the Equal Protection Clause. Laycock further
argues that because the Equal Protection Clause literally applies to every
distinction the government makes, the only sensible interpretation is that some
distinctions are more suspect than others.12 An example of the difference
between the two clauses is like the difference between the Equal Protection
Clause and the rejected Equal Rights Amendment. When lawyers argued
whether sex was a suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause,
few doubted that sex would be a suspect classification if the Equal Rights
Amendment was ratified.' 23 The Privileges and Immunities Clause specifies
its suspect class, absolutely forbids discrimination against that one class, and
applies to nothing else. The class which is discriminated against in
nonresident taxation includes all the nonresidents of the taxing state who are
subject to the offending tax. In the case of a tax on hotel rooms to pay for a
convention center, the argument is made that the specific tax used to build the
convention center will directly benefit those who are taxed.
Exceptions can be found to the Privileges and Immunities Clause. In the
First Amendment, even when a constitutional right is stated in absolute terms,
courts must imply exceptions for sufficiently compelling reasons.' 24 An
implied exception to an expressly absolute constitutional right should be an
extraordinary thing. Courts cannot legitimately imply exceptions to absolute
provisions in the same free way they construe rights that expressly depend on
what is reasonable or what is due. All constitutional rights require balancing,
but with respect to the absolute rights, balancing should be tilted heavily
against the government.
Discrimination against citizens of sister states will sometimes be
justified, but only (or almost only) when such discrimination serves federal
interests and not merely the interests of the discriminating state.' 2 If a state's
121. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
122. See Laycock, supra note 122.
123. Compare Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,688 (1973) (Brennan, J., plurality)
(concluding that sex is inherently a suspect classification), with (Powell, J., concurring) (stating
that the Equal Rights Amendment would "resolve the substance of this precise question...
Id. at 692.
124. See Gary J. Simson, Discrimination Against Nonresidents and the Privileges and
Immunities Clause ofArticle IV, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 388 (1979).
125. See Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920); see Laycock, supra note 122.
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parochial interests can ever justify discrimination against citizens of sister
sates, it can only be to avoid intolerable harms. Laycock has stated that
[t]he rationale and benefit from the privileges and immunities clause is to treat
citizens of any state as citizens of the Republic, not allowing them to be subject to
mistreatment by any state merely because they are not residents of that state. Its
purpose is to allow citizens to freely travel, work and to do business in any state of
the union. Its purpose is to keep peace among the states, encourage cooperation
among the states and to discourage unfair treatment of nonresidents. The failure of
the courts to enforce these rights and to further the goals of the clause will lead to
economic wars between the states.
26
This view of the Clause derives in part from the belief that we should
examine the Constitution as a whole. 127 We cannot legitimately pick and
choose the clauses we want enforced. But the Privileges and Immunities
Clause is not an arguable constitutional mistake, nor is it an obsolete
provisions that modem Americans are stuck with; it fits neatly into modem
conceptions ofnondiscrimination. 12' Discrimination against fellow Americans
is intuitively unjust. Citizens of sister states are outsiders, subject to in-
group/out-group bias, denied the right to vote (the key to power in the political
process), and are thus dependent onjudicial protection. The state courts of the
taxing states have been failing to give the proper protections to overtaxed
nonresidents. Interpreters of the Constitution should not seek out ways to
minimize the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
The Supreme Court has not treated all textually absolute constitutional
rights equally. Nor has it applied the compelling interest test to the Privileges
and Immunities Clause. But it has come close. It has held that only a
"substantial" interest can justify discrimination against natural persons from
sister states,' 29 and it has invalidated much of the local discrimination under
that formulation. 130
126. See Laycock, supra note 122; see Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and
Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. R. 249
(1992).
127. See Laycock, supra note 122, at 433-36.
128. See Douglas Laycock, Notes on the Role of Judicial Review, the Expansion of
Federal Power, and the Structure of Constitutional Rights, 99 YALE L.J. 1711, 1745-47 (1990)
(reviewing ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND
CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL REvIEW (1989)); Laycock, supra note 122, at 433-36; Douglas
Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of
Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 249 (1992).
129. See Supreme Court v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274,284(1985); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S.
385, 396 (1948); Travis v. Yale and Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60 (1920).
130. See Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (discussing discrimination in bar admissions); Hicklin v.
Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978) (discussing discrimination in employment on state oil leases);
Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975) (discussing discriminatory income tax);
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Discrimination against sister-state corporations has been treated
differently, because the Privileges and Immunities Clause protects only
citizens. Corporations cannot be citizens, and so far the Court has been
unwilling to look through the corporation and protect the sister-state
investors. 3' Instead, discrimination between local and sister-state
corporations violates the Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection
Clause."' The Supreme Court's enforcement of these prohibitions has
gradually strengthened over the years. The Court once viewed incorporation
as a privilege that could be granted or withheld for any reason or no reason,
and thus, states were free to exclude sister-state corporations or to condition
their admittance on consent to discriminatory treatment.'33 This view was
wrong even in its own time, but it became profoundly obsolete after general
incorporation statues made corporate status a right available for the asking. '13 4
Today, the Court interprets the Commerce Clause to forbid all or nearly
all discrimination on the basis of economic factors from sister-states. It has
held that discrimination against interstate commerce is "virtually per se
invalid,"'35 without hope of justification by further inquiry into state
Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415 (1952) (discussing discriminatory fee for commercial
fishing license); Toomer, 334 U.S. at 395-403 (discussing discrimination against out-of-state
shrimpers); Travis, 252 U.S. at 78-82 (1920) (discriminatory tax exemptions); Chalker v.
Birmingham & N.W. R.Y. Co., 249 U.S. 522, (1919) (discussing discriminatory taxation);
Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 247-54 (1898) (discussing discrimination in distribution of
insolvent estates); Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176, 183-84 (1877) (discussing law confiscating
debts owed to citizens of nonseceding states but not confiscating debts owed to citizens of
nonseceding states but not confiscating debts owed to citizens ofdebtor's state or other seceding
states); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. 418,430-32 (1870) (discussing discriminatory licensing tax)
131. See Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 656
(1981); see also Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 177-78 (1868).
132. See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 891-95 (1988)
(discussing discriminatory statute of limitations); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725,753-60
(198 1) (discussing discriminatory tax exemptions); cf. Ward, 79 U.S. at 425 (discussing holding
that discriminatory licensing tax applied to individuals violates both the Commerce and
Privileges and Immunities Clauses); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985)
(discussing discriminatory taxation); WHYY, Inc. v. Borough of Glassboro, 393 U.S. 117
(1968) (per curiam) (discussing discriminatory tax exemption); Wheeling Steel Corp. v.
Glander, 337 U.S. 562 (1949) (discussing discriminatory taxation), rev'd sub nom, U.S.
Gypsum Co. v. Glander 337 U.S. 951 (1949).
133. See Paul, 75 U.S. at 181.
134. See Western & SLife lns.Co., 451 U.S. at 659-68. See also Julian N. Eule, Laying
the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 451 (1982); Martin H. Reish &
Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of
Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569, 611 (1987).
135. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573,579
(1986).
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interests. 3 6 In other cases, it has said that such discriminations subject to the
"strictest scrutiny,""' or "more demanding scrutiny."' This rule applies with
equal force to discrimination against out-of-state persons and discrimination
against out-of-state goods.'3 9
Discrimination against sister-state corporations violates the Equal
Protection Clause as well, unless it bears "a rational relation to a legitimate
state purpose."'' 0 This rule is not as weak as it appears, because it carries the
important proviso that a mere desire "to favor domestic industry within the
State"'' is not a legitimate state purpose. Rather, discrimination so motivated
"constitutes the very sort of parochial discriminations that the Equal
Protection Clause was intended to prevent."' 42 Congress can authorize state
regulation of interest commerce that would otherwise be precluded by the
Commerce Clause, but presumably it cannot authorize violations of the Equal
Protection Clause.
Review of discrimination against natural persons or corporations from
sister-states should be equally stringent under any of these clauses. The
objections to discrimination against citizens of sister-states do not change
when those citizens choose to do business in corporate form. The owners of
a sister-state corporation are still fellow Americans exposed to the risk of
local bias, and their right to do business throughout the country is still
essential to national unity. The omission of corporations form the Privileges
and Immunities Clause is not an element of the constitutional scheme; it is a
relic from a time before general incorporation laws. The same constitutional
policies of national unity and interstate equality are at work in all three
clauses. The specific concerns that underlie the Privileges and Immunities
Clause form the more general right of equity in the Equal Protection Clause
and the equality component if the Commerce Clause. The Court should be
reluctant to imply exceptions to any of these protections.
136. See Bendix Autolite Corp., 486 U.S. at 89; Brown-Forrnan, 476 U.S. at 578-79.
137. See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 958 (1982) (quoting
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979)).
138. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986).
139. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 268, n.8 (1984).
140. See Western & S., 451 U.S. at 668.
141. Metropolitan Life, 470 U.S. at 878.
142. Id.
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Examples of such state discrimination are quite easily found.'43
143. For examples of discrimination practices in states taxing non-residents, see:
Alaska:
Carlson v. State, 919 P.2d 1337 (Alaska 1996): Class action challenged the State of Alaska's
practice of charging nonresident commercial fishers licensing and limited entry permit fees
three times greater than those fees charged to resident commercial fishers. The court concluded
that the State's pro rata formula in calculating and comparing the taxation burden placed on
resident and nonresident commercial fishers results in a significant difference between the two
classes. Therefore, the case was remanded for the application of the class's per capita formula
which determines the fee differential as constitutional.
California:
Davis v. Franchise Tax Bo., 139 Cal. RPTR.787 (Cal. App. 3d 1977): Plaintiffs challenged the
constitutionality of§ 18243 of the California Revenue and Taxation Code, which denies to non-
Californians the option of income averaging in computing their California income tax. The
Court of Appeals held that the denial of the option did not violate the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Constitution. Instead of forcing non-residents to show out-of-state income as a
condition of income averaging, California chose to deny the option. The denial is consistent
with the State's general policy of ignoring out-of-state income as a factor in progressive
taxation.
Delaware:
DEL. CODEANN. tit. 7, § 552 (1975): [License fees: Raw Fur Dealers-] "A resident of Delaware
shall pay to the Department a fee of $28.75 for a license under § 551 of this title. A nonresident
of Delaware shall pay a fee of $287.50 for such a license."
Illinois:
Broeckl v. Chicago Park Dist., 131111. 2d 79, 544 N.E.2d 792 (1989). Nonresidents challenged
statute permitting the park district to charge nonresidents of Chicago a higher fee than residents.
The Appellate Court held that the statute was constitutional because the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Constitution applies to discrimination against citizens of other states.
The privileges and immunities do not apply where a city or municipal ordinance discriminates
against intrastate residents.
Indiana:
Clark v. Lee, 273 Ind. 572, 406 N.E.2d 646 (1980): Case wherein courts declared Indiana
occupation income tax statute unconstitutional. The Supreme Court found that the burden of
the occupation income tax fell upon nonresidents and residents. However, that burden is
removed from residents through the credit mechanism; therefore, the tax discriminates against
nonresidents and violates the privileges and immunities guaranteed under the United States
Constitution.
Iowa:
Borden v. Selden, 259 Iowa 808, 146 N.W.2d 306 (1966): Case involved the issue of whether
the Agricultural Land Tax Credit Act of Iowa denying to nonresident owners of Iowa land a
tax credit granted resident owners of Iowa land, violates the Constitution of the United States.
The Supreme Court held that since there was no reasonable basis for the allowance of a credit
against taxes on agricultural land owned by residents, the resulting discrimination upon
nonresidents violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution.
Maine:
Stevens v. State Tax Assessor, 571 A.2d 1195 (Me. 1990): Court held that Maine's application
of a graduated tax rate applicable to nonresident taxpayers did not violate nonresident
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However, the dearth of recent cases in either the federal or state courts is a
testament to the expense and difficulty of litigating such issues. The lack if
relief granted to non-residents by the state courts is another indication of the
unavailability of remedy to taxpayers who have been discriminated against.
b. The Exceptions
i. Legitimate Discrimination Against Citizens of Sister
States
The Privileges and Immunities Clause has some legitimate implied
exceptions. For example, Alabama residents do not vote or collect welfare in
Louisiana, and they pay out-of-state tuition to attend Louisiana universities.
It is important to identify the principle that explains these exceptions, and to
examine what that principle implies for choice of law. Critics of any
constitutional clause argue that the legitimacy of some exceptions implies the
legitimacy of others.1" Such arguments are inane unless it is shown that the
proposed exception is implied by the same principles as the acknowledged
taxpayers' due process, privileges and immunities or equal protection rights. The Stevens'
challenged the method used by the State of Maine in taxing the Maine source income of
nonresidents. However, there was no improper discrimination in the application of Maine's
income tax because similarly situated residents and nonresidents are taxed at an equal rate.
Green v. State Tax Assessor, 562 A.2d 1217 (Me. 1989): Nonresidents appealed court ruling
denying tax refund. The plaintiffs' argued that they should have been allowed to carry forward
operating losses realized in Maine during previous years in which plaintiff could not deduct the
losses on their Maine income tax returns due to insufficient Maine source income. The Assessor
disallowed the losses, interpreting Maine tax law to permit taxpayers to deduct losses on their
Maine income tax return only in the year that they deduct the same losses on their federal
income tax returns. The court found that the Maine income tax law prohibits both residents and
nonresidents from carrying forward losses if those losses are not also entered on their federal
income tax returns for the same tax year. Although the Maine Income Tax Code does permit
some disparity of treatment between residents and nonresidents, Maine's Tax scheme is neutral
in its effect on residents and nonresidents.
New Hampshire:
Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975): New Hampshire Commuter's Income Tax was
struck down because the burden fell exclusively upon nonresidents. Residents of Maine
employed in New Hampshire brought a class action for a declaratory judgment that the tax
violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The Court found that the fact that Maine
residents working in New Hampshire were required by New Hampshire Commuters Income
Tax law to file New Hampshire tax return and that their employers were required to withhold
four percent of their earnings even though they were not subject to tax at that rate, and they
were thus deprived of use value of excess withheld over their ultimate tax liability, was
unconstitutional.
144. See Laycock, supra note 122, at 438.
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exception. The essential features of the uncontroversial exceptions to the
Privileges and Immunities Clause is that they are implied by the needs of the
federal structure. They serve the interest of the nation, and not merely the
interest of a single state. These exceptions must be limited to that narrow
scope. The state courts have been broadening this view for the selfish interest
of the state itself. 4
5
The most fundamental exception to the rule of equal treatment is that
each state can reserve the exercise of governmental power, including the right
to vote, to its own citizens. 46 This exception is consistent with, and required
by, the Founders' dual purpose of achieving national unity and preserving the
states as separate polities. It may seem odd to conclude that the principal
exception to a rule requiring visitors to be treated as citizens is that they
cannot exercise those ultimate political powers that we have come to think of
as the quintessential rights of citizens.
The oddity here is not in the rule. No one thinks citizens of each state
should vote in all fifty states. Residency requirements for voting have been
thought "necessary to preserve the basic conception of a political community
[.] .. ., They protect local autonomy from meddling outsiders who will not
have to live with the consequences of their votes. What seems odd is to use
the language of citizenship to describe a broad set of rights that does not
include the right to vote.
The link between citizenship and voting was much less natural and
apparent to the Founders than it is to us. Voting rights were left to positive
law, and each state determined its own qualifications for voting. 14  The
Constitution has since been amended seven times to expand rights. 149 Even
today, not all citizens are entitled to vote. Children are excluded from the
franchise without controversy, as are most felons with only modest
controversy. 5° In the Eighteenth Century, when women were excluded and
some men were still excluded due to property qualifications, only a minority
of citizens were entitled to vote.'5 ' In the Nineteenth Century, when most
145. See Laycock, supra note 122 at 438.
146. See Laycock, supra note 122 at 431.
147. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 344 (1972).
148. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
149. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; amend., XVII, XIX, XXIII, XXIV, XXVI.
150.
See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 41-56 (1974) (upholding the disenfranchisement of
ex-felons); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (invalidating disenfranchisement of
persons convicted of misdemeanors involving "moral turpitude," where the provision was
adopted with the intent to reduce the number of black voters).
151. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787,
167-69 (1969).
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female citizens were still excluded, many states allowed resident aliens to
vote. 152
Whatever the Founders may have thought about the relationship between
citizenship and voting, they plainly did not think Virginians should vote in
Massachusetts. Because, no one in the 1780's was urging that citizens of one
state be allowed to vote in any other, the Founders had no occasion to consider
whether the Privileges and Immunities Clause might be misunderstood to
apply to voting.
ii. Subsidized Social Welfare Services
The broadest exception to the Privileges and Immunities Clause covers
subsidized social welfare services. States can generally restrict such services
to their own residents, or account for the subsidy in a higher user fee for
nonresidents.'53 Otherwise, individuals could benefit from subsidies without
being subject to the taxes that pay the subsidies." 4 A claim to share benefits
without sharing their cost does not flow easily from a right to equal treatment.
Of course, the assumption that subsidies are supported by taxes on
residents is only approximately true. Only residents are subject to the state's
full taxing power,'55 but nonresidents pay some taxes and receive some
government benefits. 56 The argument that the state can confine subsidies to
residents uses residence as a proxy for tax liability. Like all proxies, it is not
entirely accurate.
152. See generally, Gerald M. Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why not the Right
to Vote?, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1092, 1096-99 (1977).
153. Cf Sturgis v. Washington, 368 F. Supp. 38 (W.D. Wash. 1973.) aff'd mem., 414
U.S. 1057 (1973) (upholding differential in tuition for state university against challenge under
the Equal Protection Clause); Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), aff'd
mem., 401 U.S. 985 (1971) (upholding differential in tuition for state university upheld against
a challenge under the Equal Protection Clause). In dictum, several cases have recognized that
bona fide residence requirements are generally valid. See, e.g., Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S.
321, 325-30 (1983); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 227, n.22 (1982); Vlandis v. Kline, 412
U.S.441,452-53 (1973). Martinez upheld a local-residence requirement for school districts that
applied equally to in-state and out-of-state residents. See Martinez, 461 U.S. at 328, n.8. The
Court subsequently held that local and state residence requirements are equivalent for purposes
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and that either requires justification under the Clause.
See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 215-18,222-23
(1984).
154. A similar argument is developed by Jonathan D. Varat. See Jonathan D. Varat,
State "Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 522-23 (1981).
155. See New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 312-13 (1937).
156. See Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975).
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The need to confine subsidies to residents does not wholly depend on
equity to individual taxpayers. The structural problem is more fundamental:
If Americans were entitled to subsidized services in every state, whole states
could be free-riders. A state could decide there was no need to create a state
university so long as its students could be educated at the expense of the
taxpayers elsewhere, and no need to pay welfare benefits so long as its
citizens could claim benefits in any state they might choose. A small state
like Rhode Island, where nearly the whole population lives within commuting
distance of another state, could rely on its neighbors for a wide range of social
services.
No body of taxpayers will support subsidized services for an unlimited
number of visitors who do not help pay for the subsidy. Application of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause to subsidized services would create
inexorable pressure to reduce or eliminate state subsidies for such services.
Ultimately, most such services would have to be provided at the federal level,
and a key feature of federalism-the voters' ability to choose different levels
of government to perform different functions-would be eliminated. Interstate
eligibility for social services would inevitably consolidate the provision of
social services just as interstate voting would consolidate our separate
politics. If we are to have separate states at all, each of us must be
constitutionally entitled to vote and receive subsidized services in one and
only one of those states. There were few subsidized services in the Founders'
time, and they did not thoroughly consider the exception. Rather, they
probably took for granted the basic point.
The exception for subsidized social services must contain at least some
exceptions of its own. Visitors from other states must be eligible for services
that are essential to interstate travel and commerce, even if those services are
subsidized. The precise borders of this category may require case-by-case
protection, emergency medical care, and other emergency services.' This
conclusion is also derived from the needs of the Union. If visitors could not
use these services as needed, no one could safely travel interstate. Because
travelers demand for necessary services is reciprocal-and because states
collect substantial sums fortravelers through neutral taxes on gasoline, hotels,
and retail sales-this restriction on state power does not threaten the separate
existence of the states or their ability to make policy choices and fund
services.
157. See Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional
Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L.R. 249, 273 (1992).
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iii. Other Possible Exceptions
Any other legitimate exceptions to the Privileges and Immunities Clause
should be construed narrowly. It should never be enough that local citizens
need the benefit of discrimination, because the need of similarly situated
citizens of sister-states is just as great.'58 The state can draw its lines on the
basis of need rather than citizenship, or it can subsidize its own needy and
rely on the subsidized social services exception. Exceptions can never be
based on hostility or indifference to citizens of sister-states, or on ajudgement
that their interests are less important or less deserving of the state's attention
than the interests of locals. Claims that citizens of sister-states are the source
of some special difficulty requiring discriminatory legislation should be
subject to strict scrutiny. The exception applying to taxation of nonresidents
should not apply to any broad based discrimination practiced against
nonresidents. It is important to follow the federal model of taxation to a great
extent and to provide similar treatment to residents and nonresidents equally,
at a rate of five percent, that would be fair treatment. But, if the state allowed
residents a deduction from their income, but denied it to nonresidents, that
would be unfair, because the nonresidents would be paying a five percent tax
on an income which is more broadly defined.'59 The reality for many citizens
of the United States is that they earn virtually all of their income in a state in
which they are not a nonresident. This reflects the free movement of citizens
across state lines to carry on business. These are the people who must be
protected from aggressive taxation.
Brainerd Currie espoused the view of "interest analysis."'60 Interest
analysis in its original version obviously violated the principle of equal
citizens. It has been argued that a state's only fully legitimate interest with
respect to an interstate transaction is to enrich its own citizens. 6' States
might take an "altruistic interest" in the welfare of nonresidents, but such
158. See United Bldg.,465 U.S. at 222-23 (remanding claim of local need for further
consideration).
159. See Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 77-78 (1920); Austin v. New
Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 656 (1975) (holding that tax laws which discriminate against
nonresidents by denying them exemptions granted to residents violates the Privileges and
Immunities Clause).
160. See BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 190-191,
(1963).
161. See id. Alfred Hill, Choice of Law and Jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, 81
COLUM. L. REv. 960,984 (1981); Alfred Hill, Governmental Interest and the Conflict ofLaws-
A Reply to Professor Currie, 27 U. CHI. L.REv. 463, 474, 476 (1960).
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interests are "of quite different order from"'62 nonaltruistic interests. The
interests of citizens of sister states did not count in the primary analysis of
state interests, and it was eventually believed that it is sometimes
unconstitutional to take such interests into account.'63 Under this view, a state
had no interest in looking after the social welfare of a nonresident. Its only
inquiry and duty relates to protecting and helping its own citizens. Under this
theory, each state could become interested in wrenching as much tax out of
nonresidents as possible. In fact, that trend is at work in some states today.
c. A Treaty Among States
Some commentators have analyzed the history of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause to mean that it was meant to preclude economic wars
between individual states." This is exactly the purpose for which the Clause
should be applied: to encourage cooperation between states in economic
policies and treatment of citizens. The Clause should be used to encourage
the free movement of citizens across state lines for the purpose of earning a
living. State should be discouraged from placing barriers to this movement,
in the form of discriminatory levies or taxes.
The application of the Privileges and Immunities Clause to disputes
concerning taxes imposed by the state on a nonresident was initiated in the
case of Travis v. Yale & Towne Manufacturing Co.,'65 where New York
imposed a tax on the income of both residents and nonresidents. The taxing
statute allowed deductions and exemptions for the residents of New York, but
did not allow equal deductions for nonresidents ofNew York. "6 This unequal
treatment was attacked on the grounds that it denied nonresidents the
privileges and immunities granted to residents of New York.'67 The Court
looked at a balancing of the distribution as well as the lack of a reasonable
basis for such discrimination. 68 The Travis court determined that a state
taxing statute, when facially discriminatory against a nonresident of a state,
162. Brainerd Currie & Herma H. Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the
Conflict ofLaws: Privileges and Immunities, 69 YALE L.J. 1323, 1360-61, 1368 (1960).
163. See id. at 1365-66.
164. See George F. Carpinello, State Protective Legislation and Nonresident
Corporations: The Privileges and Immunities Clause as a Treaty of Nondiscrimination, 73
IOWA L. REV. 351, 352-53 (1988).
165. 252 U.S. 60 (1920).
166. See id. at 73-74.
167. See id. at 72.
168. See id. at 79-81.
1999]
Law Review
will not be upheld if there is no valid rationale for the discrimination. 69
Additionally, that rationale must be sufficient to balance the discrimination
which is enacted and applied. 7' The Court noted that "due to the
geographical situation of [New York], in close proximity to the neighboring
States, many thousands of men and women, residents and citizens of the
State, go daily from their homes to the city and earn their livelihood there."' 7'
The Court went on to determine that the discriminatory treatment, causing
nonresidents to pay more taxes than residents, was an unwarranted denial of
the privileges and immunities enjoyed by the citizens of New York.' In
Travis, the Court's problem with the statute was the fact that it discriminated
against every taxpayer, and was not discrimination based upon the personal
circumstances of individual taxpayers. 73 However, the court did not address
the issue of a discrimination against a broad group of taxpayers, as opposed
to all taxpayers, because the issue was not before the Court.
IV. THE CREATION OF MARKET INEFFICIENCY
In analyzing a broad based discriminatory tax statute imposed by one
state against residents of another state, it is important to keep in mind the
issues which go behind the application of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause. An early Supreme Court case laid out the application of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause to a taxing statute.' 74
It was undoubtedly the object of the clause in question to place the citizens of each
State upon the same footing with citizens of other States, so far as the advantages
resulting from citizenship in those States are concerned. It relieves them from the
disabilities of alienage in other State; it inhibits discriminating legislation against
them by other States; it gives them the right of free ingress into other States ... ;it
insures to them in other States the same freedom possessed by the citizens of those
States in the acquisition and enjoyment of property and in the pursuit of happiness;
and it secures to them in them in other State the equal protection of their laws.1
75
When the constitutional provision was written, it was with the profound
understanding that each of the several states must not act to inhibit the lives
and economic pursuits of citizens of other states. 76 To allow discrimination
169. See id. at 78-79.
170. See id at 80.
171. Id.
172. See id at 82.
173. Travis v. Yale Towne Manufacturing Co., 252 U.S. 60, 78 (1920).
174. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1868).
175. Paul, 75 U.S. at 180.
176. See id.
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which created disincentives for the smooth flow of commerce and inhibited
the ability of citizens to freely pursue a living in any state, would create
barriers to economic development. Much time and effort was expended at
insuring that the union of states would provide an economic system which
would work to benefit all citizens of the union. 77
A. Protective and Incentive Inefficiencies
Each state has the capacity to use its local taxation to burden interstate
commerce. The danger arising from this capability has long been
recognized.1 78 The protectionist tariffs placed on the flow of goods across
state boundaries was one of the principal driving forces behind the
Constitutional Convention in 1787.179 Barriers, such as higher taxes on
nonresidents of a state, act to inhibit the movement of people across state
lines to engage in commerce, the pursuit of employment, and the carrying on
of business. The existence of discriminatory taxes creates market
inefficiencies, which are artificial and tend to poorly allocate labor
resources.' It has been viewed as critical, from an economic flow point of
view, that a tax be levied without a view to the location of the taxpayer.'' It
has been argued that taxpayers sustain significantly higher transaction costs
and tax planning costs because of the differences in states taxation.8 2 The
cost of compliance is also higher. These costs all create economic
inefficiencies. They will always be present when taxpayers are employed
across state lines.'83 These burdens should not be increased when they are
faced with discriminatory taxes imposed merely because of their nonresident
status. When applying the Commerce Clause, the courts have judged
discrimination which is not allowable, as that discrimination which provides
177. See THE FEDERALIST No. 7, at 61 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
178. See Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. 418(1870) (one of the first cases invalidating taxes
on nonresidents).
179. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 7 at 40 (Alexander Hamilton).
180. These tax discriminations have been described as "inconsistent with the very idea
of political union." Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making
Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1091, 1113 (1986); See also Philip
M. Tatarowicz & Rebecca F. Mims-Velarde, An Analytical Approach to State Tax
Discrimination Under the Commerce Clause, 39 VAND. L. REV. 879, 898-99 (1986) (discussing
the Supreme Court's view of what constitutes tax discrimination).
181. See Daniel Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation,
90 MICH. L. REv. 895, 900 (1992).
182. See id
183. See id at 909-12 (providing an excellent deception of these inefficiences).
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a commercial advantage to local business, at the expense of out-of-state
business.'84 This type of test seems to be applicable also to the protection of
citizens who are wage earners or employees. Is the taxing state providing an
advantage to local residents? Does it place nonresidents at an earning
disadvantage, by increasing their costs of carrying on their employment?
Justice Scalia, in a series of opinions, has proposed a standard which would
bar "facial" discrimination against outsiders when these outsiders are taxed
more heavily."s5 With respect to the application of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, Justice Scalia has denied "rank" discrimination in taxing
statutes. 186 It is unclear whether "rank" discrimination differs from facial
discrimination. However, it is clear that there is strong support for
prohibiting discrimination against nonresident taxpayers when it increases
their burden of earning a living.8 7
The principle that states should not discriminate against interstate
movement of commerce has been researched from many viewpoints. A
locational discrimination occurs when one location taxes a person at a higher
rate, that person will make choices to substitute one activity for another.'88
The chosen activity will be preferred in order to reduce the individual's tax
burden. 189 These types of choices are said to create a deadweight social loss
to the extent of the reduced tax liability by reason of the substitution in
choice. 0 Thus, some neutrality of tax issues from a locational standpoint is
desirable because it acts to minimize these social costs. Overall economic
benefits to society are generally maximized when individuals can choose their
own behavior without regard to tax externalities. The greatest social benefit
is attained when each individual can choose the employment which will
provide the greatest overall income-both internal to the individual and
external from the viewpoint of after tax cash benefits. Imposing excessive tax
costs on the decision-making process has the result of forcing choices with
regard to these externalities. This should not be the case. It has been argued
that an efficient tax is one that taxpayers ignore. '' It would be a tax that does
184. See Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252 (1989); see also PAUL J. HARTMAN, FEDERAL
LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION § 2:19 (1981).
185. See American Trucking Ass'n v. Smith 496 U.S. 167, 200-05 (1990); Goldberg,
488 U.S. at 271 (1989); Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232,
254 (1987); American Trucking Ass'n v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 304 (1987).
186. See Tyler Pipe Indus., 483 U.S. at 265.
187. See City of New York v. State of New York, 696 N.Y.S.2d 426 (N.Y. App. Div.
1st Dept. 1999).
188. See Shaviro, supra note 113, at 901.
189. See id
190. See id.
191. See id. at 906.
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not affect people's decisions about where to travel, where to live, where to
invest and so forth.'92 Although this type of efficient locational tax scheme
does not exist, it should be a policy goal which drives new taxation schemes.
Many adjacent states have worked toward this goal in common schemes
negotiated at meetings of the states.'93 One such "common scheme," is the
general use of the proportionate allowance of personal deductions to
nonresident taxpayers by states in which these nonresidents earn income.
94
B. The High Cost of Taxation
It can be argued that the high tax rates of a state or city act to impede the
economic growth of that state or city. 95 For example, New York City, which
has the highest rate of income taxation in the United States, has been
suffering from excessive unemployment during the expansionary period of
the 1990s.I9 Unemployment in 1997 was above 9%, which was nearly twice
the national rate of 4.8%.' 9' The city has higher rents and other costs, but
clearly the high income tax rate serves as a depressant on the local economy.
In addition, since a nonresident must pay a higher tax by being employed in
New York City than in their home state, there is another significant
disincentive to economic growth.' 98 The skilled employee who is a resident
of a nearby state would require more wages or earning in order to seek
employment in New York. These barriers to entering the market create larger
costs for local businesses, making the location less competitive than other
locations.' 99  If the state takes further steps to discriminate against
192. See id.
193. See Solomon, infra note 260, at 121-25.
194. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1126 (1997); HAW. REV.STAT. § 235-5 (c)
(1993); OKLA.STAT.ANN. tit. 236(4) (West 1992).
195. See ALAN REYNOLDS, INERNATIONAL COMPARISIOINS OF TAXES & GOVERNMENT
SPENDING, IN RATING ECONOMIC FREEDOM 336 (Stephen T. Easton & Michael Walker eds.,
1992).
196. See Peter Passell, Risk and Rewards in a Revived New York N.Y. TIMES, October
19, 1997, § 3, at 1.
197. See id.
198. The income tax rates in New Jersey and Connecticut are less than those in New
York. See Steven Prokesch, New York Sets Rules to Curb Auditors'Zeal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1,
1993, at B 1. In addition, New York City imposes a commuters' tax on nonresident employees.
See NEW YORK CITY CHARTER § 1127.
199. The marginal cost for hiring an employee in New York is higher than for hiring the
same employee in New Jersey or Connecticut, because the employee will require more in the
form of compensation in order to be induced to work in New York. Because the tax burden will
be higher on the earnings of a worker in New York, the worker would choose to work in the
other states if the salaries were equal. Only by paying a higher salary can the employer in New
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nonresidents, greater dislocations could be expected. Although it is difficult
to pinpoint higher taxation as a cause of greater unemployment, it certainly
seems to be a significant factor in increasing wage costs.
When a state takes further actions to discriminatorily tax nonresidents,
it can be expected that some nonresidents will choose not to do business in
the state, or not to seek employment in that state. There are many reasons
why people choose not to seek employment in a state where they are not a
resident, such as higher commuting costs, longer commuting time, or other
possible reasons. However, the fear of being treated badly under a
discriminatory tax scheme should not be a consideration. If the state
discriminates in one area, and the courts of that state allow such
discrimination, there is no barrier to unfair treatment in other areas. These
types of artificial barriers to interstate employment serve no useful purpose.
V. CASE HISTORY OF NONRESIDENT TAXATION
A. Travis v. Yale & Towne Manufacturing Co.2"'
The U.S. Supreme Court heard the arguments in Travis in 1919, a mere
six years after the passage of a federal income tax.'O The decision was issued
in 1920.202 The timing is important because policy regarding income taxation
was a very new concept in the United States. Until the Thirteenth
Amendment allowed an income tax in 1913, the country relied on other
sources of revenue. To place the case in its proper historic context, it is
important to understand the lack of history available to the courts. Eighty
years later, we have a greater amount of policy behind and history in using
and abusing income taxes. The economy of the United States is far more
fluid, far more interstate and far more global. The concerns and
understandings of 1919 were vastly different from the present. It is
questionable what we can gleam from this ancient opinion. But, it is the
starting point for an analysis of the maltreatment of nonresidents by a taxing
state. It is interesting to note that the issue, lost by New York State in
York lure the nonresident worker into New York. This has two effects; (1) the costs of doing
business are higher in New York, meaning that fewer employees will be hired, and (2) the
incentives are for businesses to locate themselves outside of New York, thereby causing jobs
to be located outside of the city and state.
200. 252 U.S. 60 (1920).
201. See lncome Tax Act of l913, ch. 16§ 1l,38Stat. 166, 169(1913).
202. See Travis, 252 U.S. at 60.
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Travis, °3 was once more before the Supreme Court in Lunding v. New York
Tax Appeals Tribunal. 201
To place Travis in proper historical perspective, the state of the income
tax at the time is very relevant. The deductions from income tax that were
present at that time were simply those deductions which were viewed as
related to generating income. The state of policy thinking was all related to
items which generated income, not personal items. Personal deductions did
not arise in the federal tax law until many years later.205 The deductions in
effect at the time of Travis were the deductions for necessary business
expenses, certain taxes, bad debts, depreciation, depletion, interest and net
operating losses.2' There was a provision which specifically denied any
deduction for personal expenditures.20 7 What we now view as personal
deductions, real estate taxes and interest deductions were viewed then from
the perspective of items related to generating income, or from a broad view
of the fact that all taxes paid should be deductible. Thus, when reading and
applying the holding in Travis, one must concentrate on the fact that the types
of personal deductions to which some courts are now applying Travis did not
exist at the time, and there were no policy thoughts or discussions of those
deductions for many years after Travis.2"' To argue that the Travis court
meant anything with respect to personal deductions can only be classified as
disingenuous.
The facts in Travis are quite simple, and strikingly similar to the facts in
Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal.20 9 New York State enacted an
income tax on residents of the state and upon the income of nonresidents
earned within New York.210 The tax rates were the same for both residents
and nonresidents. However, residents were granted an exemption of $1000
per taxpayer, $2000 for a married taxpayer, and $200 for each additional
dependent.2 ' No such exemptions were provided for nonresidents. 1 2 Since
203. See id. at 82.
204. 522 U.S. 287 (1988).
205. See Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 159, § 1201 (2), 39 Stat. 1000 (1917) (including a
deduction for charitable contributions).
206. See Tariffof 1913, ch. 38, Stat. 114 (1913); Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, 39 Stat.
756 (1916); Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 159, 39 Stat. 1000 (1917); Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18,
§ 214, 40 Stat. 1057 (1919).
207. See Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, 40 Stat. at 1057, 1069, 1080.
208. See Travis, 252 U.S. at 79-82.
209. 675 N.E.2d 816 (N.Y. 1996), rev'd, 522 U.S. 287 (1998).
210. See Travis, 252 U.S. at 72-74.
211. See id at 74. The term "dependent" includes persons under the age of 18 years and
persons with mental or physical defects. See id.
212. See id. at 79.
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incomes were relatively low at the time, the result was that nonresident
incomes were taxed at a higher rate than resident incomes.2"3 In many
instances, where a nonresident was employed full time in New York, he was
taxed on his entire income. When compared to the New York resident with
whom the nonresident worked, the nonresident was paying more tax to New
York, and using fewer of New York's services. In effect this was a facially
discriminatory taxation of nonresidents.
The Supreme Court, in applying the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of the U.S. Constitution to the discrimination against nonresidents, looked at
the history of that clause. Citing two previous decisions which applied the
clause, they invoked the clause in this case.214 It is very clear that from the
earliest times of the Constitution and in a continuing manner, the federal
courts have provided protection to nonresidents from unfair taxation by other
states.21 5
In Travis, the U.S. Supreme Court could not find any adequate ground
for the discrimination practiced by New York against nonresident
taxpayers.2 6 The Court held that the failure to grant similar exemptions to
nonresident taxpayers:
213. See Travis, 252 U.S. at 72.
214. See Travis, 252 U.S. at 73.
It was undoubtedly the object of the clause in question to place the citizens
of each state upon the same footing with citizens of other States, so far as
the advantages resulting from citizenship are.., concerned. It relieves them
from the disabilities of alienage in other States; it inhibits discriminating
legislation against them by other States, it gives them the right of free
ingress into other States, and egress from them; it insures to them in other
States the same freedom possessed by the citizens of those States in the
acquisition and enjoyment of property and in the pursuit of happiness; and
it secures to them in other States the equal protection of their laws. It has
been justly said that no other provision of the Constitution has tended so
strongly to constitute the citizens of the United States one people as this.
Id. at 73-74 (quoting Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180 (1868)).
Beyond doubt those words [privileges and immunities] are words of very
comprehensive meaning, but it will be sufficient to say that the clause
plainly and unmistakably secures and protects the right of a citizen of one
state to pass into any other State of the Union for the purpose of engaging
in lawful commerce, trade, or business without molestation; to acquire
personal property; to take and hold real estate; to maintain actions in the
courts of the State; and to be exempt from any higher taxes or excises than
are imposed by the State upon its own citizens.
Id. at 80 (quoting Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. 418, 430 (1870)).
215. See Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. 418 (1870).
216. Id. at 79-82.
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is an unwarranted denial to the citizens of Connecticut and New Jersey of the
privileges and immunities enjoyed by citizens of New York. This is not a case of
occasional or accidental inequality due to circumstances persons to the taxpayer, but
a general rule operating to the disadvantage of all non-residents including those who
are citizens of the neighboring states, and favoring all residents including those who
are citizens of the taxing State."37
The Travis decision should not be expanded beyond what it holds: that
a state has the power to tax nonresidents, and such taxation should not be
applied in a discriminatory manner.2" ' The income tax and its history at that
time were quite simple. Too often, courts have unreasonably enlarged the
meaning of Travis. In its simplest terms, it denies discriminatory taxation of
nonresidents by another state.
B. Austin v. New Hampshire
The U.S. Supreme Court heard another nonresident taxation case in
1975. In Austin v. New Hampshire,219 the State imposed a commuters tax on
nonresidents who derived income in New Hampshire. 220 The tax was at the
rate of 4% on income above $2000.22' The tax was challenged by a resident
of Maine who was employed in New Hampshire. 2  The Supreme Court
struck down the tax on the basis of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV of the Constitution.223 In applying the Privileges and Immunities
Clause to the taxing scheme, the Court pointed out that they had consistently
applied more stringent standards to nonresident taxation by any state because,
"nonresidents are not represented in the taxing state's legislative halls."224
The Court summarized their history in dealing with nonresident taxation as
"establishing a rule of substantial equality of [the] treatment of the citizens of
the taxing State and nonresident taxpayers. '225 In Travis, the tax on residents
was much less than the 4% imposed on nonresidents, in many instances as
low as $10.226 Austin clearly shows that discrimination in taxation by one
217. Id. at 80-81 (citations omitted).
218. See Travis, 252 U.S. at 60.
219. 420 U.S. 656 (1975).
220. See Austin, 420 U.S. at 657.
221. Seeid. at658.
222. See id. at 657.
223. See id.
224. Id. at 662.
225. Austin, 420 U.S. at 665.
226. See id. at 658. An interesting comment in Justice Blackmun's dissent in the Austin
case shows the lack of urgency many judges place upon discrimination in taxation. He says,
"I would dismiss the appeal for want of a substantial federal question. We have far more urgent
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state against the residents of another, is not to be allowed under the Privileges
and Immunities Clause.
C. Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal
1. The Facts
In December 1996, the New York Court of Appeals heard a case
involving an allegedly discriminatory tax statute which was applied to the
detriment of a Connecticut resident.27  The case involved Christopher
Lunding, an attorney with a substantial income from his practice of law in
New York City.228 He had claimed a deduction from his New York income
for alimony which he had paid to his former wife, a resident of Connecticut. 29
New York allowed residents to deduct payments of alimony to ex-spouses,
but it did not allow nonresidents to deduct such payments to ex-spouses
regardless of where the spouse resides.20 The general taxing scheme of New
York as it applies to residents of New York and nonresidents, is to follow the
federal tax system. 231' New York, however, has taken the position that one of
its "adjustments to income," alimony, is not allowable as a deduction to
nonresidents.232 The concept of a deduction for alimony is a federal concept
which derives from § 215 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 ("IRC").
Federal Adjusted Gross Income is determined by taking gross income and
deducting certain amounts described in §62 of the IRC. These amounts
include alimony paid to an ex-spouse.233 New York begins its taxing scheme
by accepting all of the IRC §62 deductions in determining Adjusted Gross
Income. At some point, the New York Department of Taxation began to
challenge the ability of nonresident taxpayers to deduct alimony from their
demands upon our limited time than this kind of litigation." Id. at 668 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Unfortunately this type of lack of interest in discriminatory taxes has emboldened
the states to go even further in plucking from their non-constituents.
227. See Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal, 675 N.E.2d 816 (N.Y. 1996),
rev'd, 522 U.S. 287 (1998).
228. See Lunding, 657 N.E.2d at 817-18.
229. See id. at 818.
230. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 63 1(b)(6) (McKinney 1987).
231. The federal and New York tax are applied on a computation of "Taxable Income."
Taxable Income is defined as follows: Gross Income minus (-) Adjustments to Income equals
(=) Adjusted Gross Income. Adjusted Gross Income minus (-) Itemized or Standard Deductions
(-) personal exemptions equals (=) Taxable Income. I.R.C. § 63 (1994).
232. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 631(b)(6) (McKinney 1987). This position, while initially
merely an administrative decision of the Department of Taxation was enacted in 1987. See id.
233. See I.R.C. § 62(a)(10)(1994).
[1:095
Constitutional Limitations
New York Adjusted Gross Income computation. It is important to note that
the tax rates applied to taxable income by New York are identical whether the
taxpayer is a resident or nonresident.234
In order to completely understand the manner in which the New York
Department of Taxation, the state legislature and the courts in New York have
acted on this issue, a history of the issue is important to consider. The history
shows that the aggressive discriminatory taxation of nonresidents was
substantially driven by the New York Department of Taxation and approved
by a court which issued a flawed decision on the matter.235 A decision which
differs from the ruling of the courts of other states. 36
2. Goodwin v. Tax Commission
In Goodwin v. Tax Commission,237 the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court of New York considered whether a nonresident of New York
could deduct his mortgage interest expense from his New York taxable
238income. Mortgage interest is a personal item of deduction allowed by the
federal government.239 Since the New York Court of Appeals in Lunding24"
relies so heavily upon the holding in Goodwin, it is relevant to closely analyze
that decision and the resulting reactions of the affected states. Goodwin, a
New Jersey resident, earned all of his income in New York.24" ' New York had
a statute which allowed certain personal expenses of residents to be deducted
from their taxable income, but denied the deduction to nonresidents.242 In
fact, this was the exact statute at issue in the Travis case in 1919.243 It had
been amended to conform with Travis v. Yale & Towne Manufacturing Co., 244
234. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 601(e) (McKinney 1987).
235. See Lunding, 675 N.E.2d 816 (N.Y. 1996).
236. See Wood v. Department of Revenue, 749 P.2d 1169 (Or. 1988).
237. 146 N.Y.S.2d 172 (App. Div. 1955).
238. See Goodwin, 146 N.Y.S.2d at 172.
239. See I.R.C. §163 (1994).
240. See Lunding, 675 N.E.2d at 816.
241. See Goodwin, 146 N.Y.S.2d at 174.
242. See id.
In the case of a taxpayer other than a resident of [this] state the deductions allowed
in this section [home mortgage interest, medical expenses in excess of 5% of net
income, real estate taxes on a home, and $150 of life insurance premiums] shall be
allowed only if, and to the extent that, they are connected with income arising from
sources within the state; and taxable under this article to a nonresident taxpayer.
N.Y. TAX LAW § 360 (McKinney 1919)(repealed in 1987).
243. See Travis, 252 U.S. at 73.
244. 252 U.S. 60 (1920).
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but the remaining language was the same.245 The court, relying on the
language of Travis, limited deductions to those "connected with income
arising from sources within the state." '246 However, this must be considered
in the context of when Travis was decided.247 At that time, the federal income
tax did not allow any deductions for personal expenditures. 24 This concept
did not develop until twenty-three years later.249 In addition, the other
adjacent states, New Jersey and Connecticut did not have income taxes in
1919, so there was no threat of retaliation from other states. In fact, the
federal income tax was only six years old.25 ' The Travis court discussed
deductions for personal expenses in a very different atmosphere.252 Thus, it
is impossible to conclude that the Travis court meant anything about this
situation. The Goodwin court recognized that, given the changed
circumstances, the Travis case may have been decided differently in modem
(1955) context.253 In Goodwin, the statute was held to be constitutional, using
a reading of Travis.254 It must be emphasized that Goodwin adheres to the
narrow view of Privileges and Immunities espoused by Brainerd Currie.2"5
The Goodwin case brought about an immediate outcry and response.256
As a direct result, Governor Averill Harriman, along with the governors of
Connecticut and New Jersey, appointed representatives to recommend and
report on the issues of nonresident taxation. 257 Governor Harriman appointed
Theodore Tannenwald, who later became the Chief Judge of the U.S. Tax
Court.25 ' Governor Robert Meyner of New Jersey appointed William C.
245. See Goodwin, 146 N.Y.S.2d at 175.
246. Id. at 176 (quoting Travis, 252 U.S. at 73).
247. See Travis, 252 U.S. at 60. Travis was argued in 1919 and decided in 1920.
248. See GODFREY N. NELSON, INCOME TAX LAW ACCOUNTING (Macmillan & Co.
1918).
249. See Revenue Act of 1942.
250. New Jersey enacted an income tax in 1961, Connecticut enacted an income tax in
1992.
251. The Initial Income Tax was enacted on October 3, 1913. (38 Stat. 166, chap. 16).
252. The concept of deductions was not prevalent, and the nearby states had no income
taxes.
253. See Goodwin, 146 N.Y.S.2d at 181-82.
254. See id. at 180-82.
255. At the time of Goodwin, Currie's ideas were well accepted, and courts believed that
neighboring states were free game. That thinking has been significantly challenged in recent
cases. See Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287 (1998).
256. See Michael Solomon, Nonresient Personal Income Tax: A Comparative Study in
Eight States, 29 FORDHAM L.REv. 105 (1960-61).
257. See Nonresidents Get New Hope on Tax, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 11, 1959, at 1.
258. See generally, Solomon, supra note 260 (discussing and analyzing the history of
nonresident taxation).
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Warren, Dean of Columbia Law School, and Governor Abraham Ribicoff of
Connecticut appointed Roswell Magill to the panel.259 In 1959, newly elected
Governor of New York, Nelson Rockefeller, began a major study of the
nonresident tax issue.260  A report was issued in 1959.26 The report
recommended that nonresidents be allowed the same nonbusiness deductions
as residents, "but that such deductions be allowed to nonresidents in
proportion to their New York income to income from all sources.126
2
Comments were received, and in response to the general feeling that New
York imposed a tax on nonresidents which was grossly disparate from the
services provided by New York to the nonresidents, Governor Rockefeller
issued legislative recommendations. 23  A bill was introduced into the
legislature, but was not passed during the 1960 legislative session.2" Due to
the bill's failure, there was talk of retaliatory legislation in both Trenton and
Hartford.265 New Jersey, under the direction of Governor Meyner, began to
enact retaliatory legislation.2" In this atmosphere of threatened retaliation,
New York enacted what has become Tax Law § 635, providing the
proportional deduction of itemized deductions by nonresidents. 67 In fact,
most states allow the proportioning of deductions for personal expenses.268
Some states only allow such proportionate treatment if the nonresident's state
259. See Nonresidents Get New Hope on Tax, supra note 261, at ].
260. See id.; see also Douglas Dales, Talks to Ease Tax on Nonresidents Open with
Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1959, at 1.
26 1. See, NONRESIDENT TAX STUDY COMM., REPORT ON TAXATION OF NONRESIDENTS
BY NEW YORK STATE (1959).
262. Id. at 48.
263. See Warren Weaver Jr., Governor Yields to Nonresidents on Tax Reduction, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 27, 1960, at 1.
264. See N.Y. Assembly No. 3829 (1960); see also N.Y. Senate No. 3158 (1960).
265. See George Cable Wright, 2 States Weigh Nonresident Tax, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 28,
1960, at 37.
266. See N.J. Assembly No. 65 (1960).
267. See N.Y. LEGIS. SERV., INC., 1961 NEW YORK LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL 398(1961).
Governor Rockefeller, in approving the new Bill added the following comments:
In December 1959 the first major study since 1919 of problems surrounding
nonresident taxation was completed by Commissioner Joseph H. Murphy and his
special consultant, Albert C. Petite. This survey furnished the basis for subsequent
discussions held by me and the Legislative Leaders with the Governors of
Connecticut and New Jersey. This bill, reflecting the survey and subsequent
discussions, represents the fairest and most equitable solution to this problem of many
years' standing.
Id. Tax Law § 635 still provides for this proportioning of itemized income tax deductions by
nonresidents of New York. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 635 (McKinney 1988).
268. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1126(1993); HAW. REv. STAT. § 235-5(c)(1997);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 2362(4) (West 1992).
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allows the same to its residents.269 The important point of this history and the
existence of the proportionate allowance statutes is that a problem was raised,
states became overly aggressive, and a solution was found in negotiations
between the states.27 That solution has been in effect for over 35 years, and
has worked well. It should not be overturned by one aggressive state. That
would begin the path away from rational reason.27' If state governments act
in a rational manner in approaching and resolving a problem involving
economic matters between citizens of the state, it should not be in the
province of a court of one of the states to upend that resolution.272 This
"treaty" resolution is exactly the type of impetus which the Privileges and
Immunities Clause should generate.273
Acts of the New York legislature, in enacting the -hange in treatment of
alimony, and the New York Court of Appeals in Lunding, appeared to be the
attempt to change what had been accomplished in a reasoned governmental
response to both Goodwin and the possibility of retribution by neighboring
states.274 To conclude that Goodwin is a decision to be followed ignores the
entire history of the responses to the initial case and the reactions to it.
Goodwin does not exist in a common law vacuum. The governors and
legislatures and their representatives discussed and enacted a response to that
case. 275 The aggressive response of the New York Department of Taxation
to the change in the federal treatment of the alimony deduction now threatens
to undo the whole process.276 If the Department of Taxation is given a further
imprimatur for taxing personal expense of nonresidents, it can reasonably be
expected to do so.277 There is no reason to go back to the retaliatory
framework which existed after Goodwin. The Court of Appeals decision in
Lunding, relying in part on the Goodwin holding, ignores the entire rational
response.278
269. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-30-131 (1979).
270. See Solomon, supra note 260.
271. See id. What occurs when one state takes an aggressive stand toward nonresidents
in often awar of new taxes. See Abby Goodnough, Judge Upholds and Extends Commuter Tax
Repeal, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1999, at Al. See Igoe v. Pataki, 696 N.Y.S.2d 355 (1999).
272. See discussion in Sec. II(b)i.
273. See id.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 253-58.
275. See Solomon, supra note 260.
276. See Lunding, 675 N.E.2d at 818.
277. The aggressive history of the New York Department of Taxation indicates that the
Department is always trying to enlarge the definition of taxable income of nonresidents. They
did so before the Goodwin decision, and again before the Lunding cases.
278. See Lunding, 675 N.E.2d at 816.
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3. The Alimony Issue in Lunding
Prior to 1976, alimony had been a deduction which was an itemized
deduction for federal income tax purposes, and an itemized deduction for
New York taxable income purposes.279 In the Tax Reform Act of 1976,280
Congress changed the alimony deduction to a I.R.C. § 62 deduction. 28' The
change was enacted by Congress to provide a more liberal treatment of the
deduction of alimony. By this Act, the alimony deduction was changed from
an "itemized deduction" to a "deduction" of income in determining adjusted
gross income, so that alimony payment would benefit taxpayers who take the
standard deduction, as well as those who itemized their deductions. 22 This
liberalized federal policy automatically inured to the benefit of New York
residents on their New York tax returns because the starting point for a
resident is the federal adjusted gross income which affords him the benefit of
an alimony payment offset whether reported as an "itemized deduction" or as
a "deduction" from adjusted gross income. There was no state legislative
response to this liberalized federal policy and the legislature gave no
indication that either New York's historical policy of following federal tax
policy, or its long-standing treatment of alimony vis-a-vis nonresidents was
to be changed in any respect.283 The deduction would benefit some taxpayers
who did not have other itemized deductions, and thus were not receiving full
benefit from their alimony deduction.28 4
279. The personal income tax of New York, effective on April 18, 1960 provided "that
the adoption by this state for its personal income tax purposes of the provisions of the laws of
the United States relating to the determination of income for federal income tax purpose will
(1) simplify preparation of state income tax returns by taxpayers, (2) improve enforcement of
the state income tax through better use of information obtained from federal income tax audits,
and (3) aid interpretation of the state tax law through increased use of federal judicial and
administrative determinations and precedents. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 615 (McKinney 1988).
Section 615 includes alimony as an itemized deduction in New York, by reference to federal
law. See id.
280. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976).
281. The purpose of this change was to extend the benefit of the deduction to taxpayers
who took a standard deduction as well as those who itemized deductions. In effect, it was a
liberalization meant to benefit taxpayers. See I.R.C. § 62(10) (1994).
282. See I.R.C. § 62(10) (1994). See Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 502, 90 Stat. 1520,
1531 (1976).
283. See supra text accompanying notes 219-27.
284. Itemized deductions are only beneficial when the total itemized deductions of a
taxpayer exceeds the taxpayer's standard deduction. If the standard deduction is $3000, then
a taxpayer who paid $3000 of alimony would not benefit from the payment. By making the
deduction a reduction in adjusted gross income, there is a greater tax incentive to make the
payments. The statutory change was made to benefit the taxpayer who did not have significant
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Although the New York Legislature did not react to this federal change,
the New York Department of Taxation, based upon their analysis of the
sources of such a deduction, made an administrative determination that the
deduction of alimony from New York source income would not be allowed
to nonresident taxpayers.285 This aggressive step, aimed at taxpayers who had
been given a benefit by the U.S. Congress, was the first step in a long battle.286
It is a good illustration of the lengths to which an aggressive taxing state will
go to act punitively towards nonresident taxpayers.2 7
4. Friedsam v. State Tax Commission
The interpretation by the Department of Taxation was challenged by a
taxpayer in Friedsam v. State Tax Comission. 28 The Appellate Division of the
New York Supreme Court, Third Department, which hears all appeals from the
New York Tax Court, held that the New York Department of Taxation, in
denying the deduction for alimony to nonresident taxpayers, violated the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution and they laced the
authority to impose such a denial.289 The court specifically found that "no
substantial reason for the disparate treatment between residents and
nonresidents exists."29 This holding was generated by the absolute lack of a
policy behind the New York position.29" ' New York has never stated any policy
other itemized deductions. There was no other stated purpose behind the change. See Tax
Reform Act § 502.
285. In addition to New York, four states limit the deduction of alimony to residents of
their state: Alabama, California, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See ALA. CODE § 40-18-15
(18) (1993); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17302 (West 1994); W. VA. CODE §1 1-21-32(b)(4)
(1995); WIS. STAT. § 71.05(6)(a)(12) (1989); see also ILL. COMI. STAT. ANN. chap.35 § 5-
301 (c)(2)(A) (West 1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5747.20(B)(6)(Anderson 1994).
286. See IRC § 63. If a taxpayer was utilizing the standard deduction, because she had
too few itemized deductions, the ability to treat alimony as an itemized deduction meant that
no benefit would received from the availability of the itemized deduction of alimony.
287. The California and New York Department of Taxation have consistently been
described as the two most aggressive state tax authorities in the United States. See Prokesch,
supra note 202, at B 1; see also H.J. Cummins, Cleaning Up: New York Is One of the Country's
Two Most Aggressive Tax-collecting States, NEWSDAY, Mar. 22, 1993, at 25. Describing how
in December 1992 the New York Department of Taxation probably undertook the most
notorious aggressive state action. During the Christmas buying season, the Department sent
agents to New Jersey shopping malls, who recorded New York License plates and then notified
their owners that they were subject to paying the higher New York sales taxes. See id.
288. 470 N.Y.S.2d 848 (App. Div. 1983), affd on other grounds, 473 N.E.2d 1181
(N.Y. 1984).
289. See Friedsam,470 N.Y.S.2d at 848.
290. Id. at 850.
291. The legislative history of the enactment of N.Y. TAX LAW § 631 (b)(6) is absolutely
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supporting their position.292 The dissent in Friedsam, suggested some policies
which may exist.293 This Appellate Division held that the Commission's
determination supporting a disparate tax classification between resident and
nonresident taxpayers is contrary to statute and tax policy of this state.294
Petitioner sought an alimony "deduction" proportional to the ratio of his
New York income derived from all sources.295 The amount by which petitioner
reduced adjusted gross income for his alimony payment was commensurate
with the income derived from New York sources, and was consistent with the
reduction allowed to residents under similar circumstances.296 The Appellate
Division held: "in disallowing petitioner's alimony deduction the Tax
Commission improperly applied section 632(a)(1) of the Tax Law."'297 New
York Tax Law § 635 provides that nonresidents are to be allowed the same
nonbusiness deductions as residents, but such deductions are to be allowed in
proportion to the taxpayer's New York income to income from all sources.298
The court believed that the passage of § 635 (c)(1) reflected a policy
decision .2  This case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals by the
Department of Taxation."'
In Friedsam, the New York Court of Appeals faced two issues. First, was
the denial of the alimony deduction to a nonresident a constitutional
application of the tax law?30' And second, was the denial of the deduction
within the scope of the administrative power of the Department of Taxation?3 2
The New York Court of Appeals, refused to decide the issues.30 3 They simply
silent.
292. See id.
293. See id. at 852 (Levine, J., dissenting). Justice Levine believed that no deduction
need be allowed to a nonresident for activities "intimately connected with the State [not] of his
residence." Id.
294. See id.
295. See id.
296. See id.
297. Friedsam, 473 N.E.2d at 1184.
298. N.Y. TAX LAW § 635.
299. See Joseph Hawley Murphy & Albert C. Petite, Taxation of Nonresidents by New
York State, 12 SYRACUSE L. REV. 147, 161-2 (1960-61); see also, N. Y. LEGIS. SERV., INC.,
1961 NEW YORK LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL 398 (1961).
300. See Friedsam, 473 N.E.2d at 1181.
301. See id. at 1182.
302. See id.
303. This refusal, based upon the fact that the case could be decided upon the lack of
administrative authority, ultimately led to nine years of trouble for taxpayers, extended
litigation in the courts and costs to both. The issue, should have been faced then. When dealing
with an aggressive state agency, the court should look to grant guidance when it has a chance.
To take the position that the issues do not need not be decided may be important for the U.S.
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ruled that the Department of Taxation did not have the authority to deny the
deduction.3" Specifically, the court analyzed the section of New York Tax
Law which guarantees equal tax treatment to both residents and
nonresidents. °5 Alimony had traditionally been deemed an itemized deduction
on federal income tax returns. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the Appellate Division on statutory, not constitutional, grounds.3"
After the decision in Friedsam, the legislature enacted the Tax Reform
and Reduction Act of 1987307 which added tax law § 631 (b)(6) to address the
Supreme Court, but in reality, a court which is the highest in a state should look to make their
views known. In this case, the matter could have been dealt with in a far less costly manner.
Thousands of taxpayers have been denied their rights to the deduction because of the position
of the Department of Taxation. Very few will be aware of any change brought about and fewer
still will be able to bring a refund action. The statute of limitations has long ago expired for
most of these taxpayers. Only lawyers can afford to challenge this action. Others are denied
the right because of the costs involved. This clearly shows another reason why states should
not be allowed to treat nonresident taxpayers as fair game. See supra text accompanying note
48.
304. See Friedsam, 473 N.E.2d at 1184.
305. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 635(c)(1) (McKinney 1988). This section provides that
nonresident taxpayers be allowed the same non-business deductions as residents, but that such
deductions be allowed to nonresidents in proportion to their New York income to income from
all sources. See Murphy and Petite, supra note 303, at 162. Section 632 of the New York Tax
Law defines New York adjusted gross income for nonresidents as follows:
(a) General. The New York [adjusted gross] income of a nonresident individual shall
be the sum of the net amount of items of income, gain, loss and deduction entering
into his federal adjusted gross income, as defined in the laws of the United States
for the taxable year, derived from or connected with New York sources...
(b) Income and deductions from New York sources. -
(1) Items of income, gain, loss and deduction derived from or connected with New
York sources shall be those items attributable to: ...
(B) a business, trade, profession or occupation carried on in this state.
N.Y. TAX LAW § 631 (McKinney 1988). Section 635, which deals with deductions from
adjusted gross income, provides that the New York itemized deduction of a nonresident shall
be the same as for a resident individual under § 615, or the total amount of the following of his
deductions from federal adjusted gross income. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 635(c) & (d) (McKinney
1998). Residents are permitted to deduct from their New York adjusted gross income the
itemized deductions claimed on their Federal tax returns, which includes alimony, subject to
various modifications not relevant here. N.Y. TAX LAW § 615 (McKinney 1988).
306. See Friedsam, 473 N.E.2d at 1181.
307. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 210 (McKinney 1987) This Act was passed as a response to
the 1986 Tax Reform Act passed by Congress. Imbedded within this large Act was the change
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Court of Appeals' concerns, and provide express statutory authority to deny the
alimony deduction to nonresidents. This action by the legislature to grant the
Department of Taxation the power that it had been denied by the courts, was
a typical example of the dysfunctional New York State Legislature. It was
accomplished quickly, with no open debate, and no legislative history. It
clearly shows the possibility of legislative abuse when there is no constituency
to complain. The Department of Taxation takes a matter to the legislature, and
with almost no discussion, and since it only affects nonresidents, is virtually
guaranteed approval.3"8 Nonresidents who will be affected by the change have
no opportunity to complain, nor are they protected by any representation. This
matter was not even the subject of a public debate.
The New York system of taxation is a culmination of the most dangerous
possibilities for nonresident taxpayers: an overly aggressive department of
taxation, a legislature which is unlikely to give much consideration to more
subtle issues of discriminatory taxation, and a court system which has clearly
avowed its position that nonresidents will obtain no protection from the New
York courts. The Department of Taxation was granted a free hand to tax
nonresidents and can go forward unrestrained. The only available protection
for these nonresident taxpayers is the application of constitutional protections
by the federal courts.
in treatment of alimony. This was the response of the Department of Taxation to its loss in the
Friedsam case, and was accomplished with the least amount of discussion and greatest stealth
possible. The change in § 63 1(b)(6) was included in the technical and conforming changes.
308. The lack of input by legislators, in general, and the total control of the New York
legislative process by the Senate majority leader and House speaker has been well documented,
and even the Governor has stated it as a given. The people who report on the New York
legislature are virtually unanimous in their view that the legislature is dysfunctional. Since the
possibility of a constitutional convention will not necessarily be available for at least the next
twenty years, it is unlikely to change. See Elsa Brenner, A New Constitution: Yes or No?, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 2, 1997, § 14 (Westchester Weekly), at 1; James Dao, Pataki and D 'Amato Back
Constitutional Convention, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1997, at B5; A Three Cornered Pork Barrel,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1997, at A26; Albany Follies, For All The Help It Brings Long Island,
The State Budget Is Still a Shameful Debacle, NEWSDAY, Aug. 6, 1997, at A36; Sorry Spectacle
in Albany, NEWSDAY, Aug. 5, 1997, at A8; Albany Is A Sewer, Flush It Out Please, NEWSDAY,
Aug. 4, 1997, at A26; 209 Empty Suits, Legislators Should Reject Rubber-Stamp Role,
NEWSDAY, Aug. 3, 1997, at G1; A Plan To Get Albany Unstuck And Ensure State Budgets On
Time Year After Year, THE BUFFALO NEWS, July 18, 1997, at 2C; State Of Disarray, New York
Is About To Set Records For Tardiness And Not Just For The Late Budget, NEWSDAY, July 2,
1997, at A36; Albany Budget Endgame, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1997, at A20; Is There No Limit?,
DAILY NEWS, June 30, 1997, at 26.
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5. The Lunding Decision in the Appellate Division
The challenge to the legislative action came from a lawyer, Christopher
Lunding. Lunding and his wife are Connecticut residents. 09 In 1990, Mr.
Lunding, a partner in a New York City law firm, derived substantial income
from his practice in New York.310 On their joint New York nonresident tax
return filed for the year 1990, they reported a federal adjusted gross income of
$788,210, which included an adjustment of $108,000 for the full amount of
alimony that Mr. Lunding paid that year to his former spouse, also a
Connecticut resident."' On their return, petitioners adjusted their New York
State gross income by 48% of the alimony payments-equaling $51,934-which
represented the percentage of Mr. Lunding's 1990 claimed New York business.
Relying on Tax Law § 631 (b)(6), the Audit Division of the Department of
Taxation and Finance denied the alimony deduction and recalculated
petitioners' New York tax liability.1 2 Lunding appealed the determination,
alleging that § 631 (b)(6) violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause,3"3 the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,3"4 and the Commerce
Clause."1 5
Under New York Tax procedure, an administrative hearing can be granted
as an appeal from a determination. 1 6 In the instance of a constitutional
challenge there is a procedure for a declaratoryjudgement.3 17 Mr. Lunding was
not aware of the labyrinth of New York tax procedure, and filed an appeal with
the New York Tax Court."' This was an utterly useless proceeding, because
the Tax Court judge does not have jurisdiction over constitutional issues.3
309. See Lunding, 675 N.E. 2d at 818.
310. See id
311. See id
312. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 631 (b)(6) is the statue which denies the dedction of alimony
by nonresidents. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 631 (b)(6) (McKinney 1988).
313. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl.l.
314. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
315. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
316. See N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 2006, 2008 (McKinney 1988).
317. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3001 (Consol. 1997).
318. See Lunding, 675 N.E.2d at 818.
319. It is easy to understand how a taxpayer, even an attorney, could misunderstand the
appeals procedure. The New York Tax Law is a jumble. The procedural aspects make even
a seasoned tax attorney confused. They differ significantly from federal tax procedure and are
not well explained in many places, certainly not by the publications of the New York State Tax
Department. This certainly adds to expense and the unlikely possibility of any appeals being
taken. The jurisdiction of the courts is limited to very narrow instances in which the tax court
has made clear errors and where there are constitutional issues. See David Schmudde, New
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The Administrative Law Judge sustained the disallowance, holding that the
Tax Appeals Tribunal lacked authority to declare the statute unconstitutional. In their
exception, petitioners conceded that the Tribunal's jurisdiction did not encompass
their constitutional challenge but asserted that principles of collateral estoppel and
stare decisis applied, relying on the Third Department's ruling in [Friedsam]. The
Tribunal affirmed the decision of the A[dministrative] L[aw] J[udge], agreeing that
Friedsam was not dispositive.32°
This was based upon the fact that the legislature had changed the statute after
the Friedsam case was decided, but before the years involved in Lunding.32 l
Thereafter, [Lunding] commenced an article 78 proceeding. 322 The Appellate Division
converted the constitutional challenge into a declaratory judgement action and retained
[the case] as an article 78 proceeding .... While recognizing both that this Court had
affirmed Friedsam solely on statutory grounds and that the statutory provisions in the
two cases are different, the Appellate Division declared the statute violative of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause.
323
The Commissioner of Taxation appealed as of right.124 The Appellate
Division upheld their previous constitutional analysis, that the application of
the statute to the taxpayers was unconstitutional .325 "Addressing the challenge
to Tax Law § 631 (b)(6) as being violative of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause because only nonresident taxpayers are denied the alimony deduction,"
the Appellate Division followed their decision in Friedsam.326 Friedsam
"addressed whether Tax Law former § 632 violated the same constitutional
provision by denying the nonresident petitioner, employed in New York and
livining in Connecticut the income tax adjustment for alimony paid to his
nonresident ex-spouse.,, 327 The court had held that "although a disparity in
treatment is permitted if valid reasons exist, the Privileges and Immunities
Clause proscribes such conduct as discriminatory against nonresidents 'where
there is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that
they are citizens of other States. ' '32 The court rejected the stated reason that
York Practice and Procedure, chap. 38.
320. Lunding, 675 N.E.2d at 818.
321. See id.
322. An Article 78 proceeding is the method by which a taxpayer can challenge a
determination of the Tax Department in the state courts. They must bring a case in the
Appellate Division, Third Department, in Albany, New York. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 2016
(McKinney 1988).
323. Lunding, 675 N.E.2d at 818.
324. See id. (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. 560 1(b)(1) (Consol. 1997)).
325. See Lunding, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 521.
326. Id. at 520.
327. Id.
328. Id. (quoting Golden v. Tully, 452 N.Y.S.2d 748, affd, 449 N.E.2i 406 (N.Y.
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"alimony payments are purely personal in nature and not related to income
producing activities in New York to justify the disparate treatment, [and] found
that the petitioner had been unconstitutionally denied the alimony
deduction." '329
When confronted with the change in the tax law, the appellate division,
in considering Lunding, found that "the addition of Tax Law § 631 (b)(6) to
expressly authorize the denial of the alimony deduction to nonresidents [did]
not alter or undermine [their] previous findings concerning the constitutionally
of such practice or present a 'compelling reason' to reach a different result on
the identical legal issue. '30 Applying the concept that "[o]nce this Court has
decided a legal issue, subsequent appeals presenting similar facts should be
decided in conformity with the earlier decision under the doctrine of stare
decisis, which recognizes that legal questions, once resolved, should not be
reexamined every time they are presented., 33' The Court again upheld their
constitutional analysis in Friedsam.332 The Appellate Division, in Lunding
stated that an "examination of the legislative history behind Tax Law § 631
(b)(6) reveals no stated reason or discussion addressing the rationale
underlying a denial to only nonresidents of the alimony deduction authorized
by the Internal Revenue Code § 215 in proportion with their New York
income.,, 33' Again, New York State offered no compelling reason for the
disparity in treatment of nonresidents as compared to residents. The Court
specifically determined that
Federal policy regarding the alimony deduction recognizes that tax consequences
should rightly fall upon the recipients of the alimony, not the payors and that pursuant
to [the New York] statute ... the denial of the deduction to a nonresident taxpayer
ignores, inter alia, where the recipient resides or whether the recipient is taxed by this
State.1
4
The Court found that "there exists no substantial reason for the disparate
treatment, leaving as '[t]he only criterion.., whether the payor is a resident
or nonresident."'335 The holding of a lack of a constitutional basis for the
1983)).
329. Id. at 520-21 (quoting Friedsman, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 848) (internal quotes omitted).
330. Lunding, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 521 (citing Dufel v. Green, 603 N.Y.S.2d 624 (App.Div.
1993)).
331. Id. (emphasis added).
332. See id.
333. Id; see also Senator Warren M. Anderson, Memorandum of Senator Warren M.
Anderson, IN NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL 58-59 (1997).; Governor Mario M.
Cuomo, Annual Message State of NewYork, IN NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL
(1987).
334. Lunding, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 521 (citations omitted).
335. Id. (quoting Friedsam, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 848).
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discrimination led to the ultimate conclusion: "[W]ithout more, there results
a constitutional violation." '336 This is exactly the analysis which is required by
the "treaty" analysis of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The states
should not discriminate against nonresident citizens. And, in cases where the
state presents no rationale for the discrimination, it should not be upheld. The
courts here are left to speculate as to the New York legislative intent.
VI. NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS DECIDES LUNDING
The Lunding case and the continuing saga went forward again to the New
York Court of Appeals.337 The court of appeals upheld the New York statute
in an opinion which is flawed in many ways.
The court of appeals began "with the familiar proposition that statutes-the
enactments of a co-equal branch of government-enjoy a presumption of
constitutionality. Moreover, 'in taxation, even more than in other fields,
legislatures possess the greatest freedom in classification.""'33 This type of
declaration, avowing a cavalier attitude towards taxpayers, has been a common
belief of courts. It may be a leading reason why our tax system is so
inhospitable to taxpayers.339 The courts are the place where taxpayers can
336. Id.
337. See Lunding v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 675 N.E.2d 816 (N.Y. 1997). [hereinafter
Lunding Ill]. It is very interesting to note that all of the people who have challenged the alimony
deduction denial, in Friedsam, Lunding and in the Oregon case of Wood were attorneys. This
is not mere coincidence. The appeals process is so time consuming and costly, with so little
hope for success, that only an attorney can afford to make the case for himself. In fact, in
Lunding, the taxpayer appeared in the U.S. Supreme Court for himself. See Linda Greenhouse,
Alimony Case, in Supreme Court, CouldAlter New York's Tax Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1997,
at B 1. This indicates that it is unlikely that a taxpayer who is not an attorney could ever hope
to succeed with the process. The amount of state tax involved would not justify the great
expense that the state is willing to put the taxpayer through. Under New York state Tax Law,
any appeal to the Courts must be made in Albany, New York, thereby increasing the difficulty
and expense to challenge a constitutional issue. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 2016 (McKinney 1988).
All of the requirements make any challenge, difficult, costly and very unlikely.
338. Lunding II, 675 N.E.2d at 816 (quoting Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656,
661-62 (1975)).
339. The lack of protection for taxpayers has manifested itself in what is perceived to
be an out of control Internal Revenue Service. If the courts had provided protection for the
taxpayers, this may have been avoided. The truth is that the IRS is much fairer and better run
than the New York Department of Taxation. But, it is now clear that the New York courts will
not provide any protection from administrative abuses by this agency. See David S. Broder,
Shaking Up The IRS, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1997, at A 19; George Guttman, Overtaxed, The
Internal Revenue Service No Longer Meets Anyone s Expectations, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIBUNE, Oct. 19, 1997, at G-1; Hugh R. Morley, Rothman Cites Examples ofAbuse by IRS,
BERGEN COUNTY REc., Oct. 17, 1997, at L2; IRS Restructuring-Where does it go From Here?,
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receive protection from offending administrative agencies. A failure to provide
that protection will lead to an agency which has little care for fairness in
dealing with taxpayers. After all, if the courts are cavalier and hold the agency
to a low standard, what would compel the agency to be fair. Courts must begin
to understand their role in dealing with aggressive tax agencies. There has
been an utter lack of that protection in recent times. Courts too often cite
platitudes about how the legislature has a free reign. This ignores the lack of
understanding and caring which exists in the legislature. This is most critical
when dealing with nonresident citizens.
The Lunding 1I court noted that the Privileges and Immunities Clause
entitles the "Citizens of each State ... to all Privileges and Immunities of
Citizens in the several States."34 They further stated that the clause "was
intended to create a national economic union and establish a norm of comity
between [the] States. The Clause in essence ensures that citizens of State A
may do business in State B on terms of substantial equality with the citizens
of that State.",3 4' Having stated that proposition, the court went on to dismantle
it.
The court relied on "two seminal decisions on State income taxation of
nonresidents under the Privileges and Immunities Clause-Shaffer v. Carter and
Travis v. Yale and Towne Manufacturing Co. 3 42 The Lunding II court noted
that in Shaffer and Travis the Supreme Court had
established that limiting taxation of nonresidents to their in-State income was a
sufficient justification for similarly limiting their deductions to expenses derived from
sources producing that in-State income. Further, the Court made clear that in testing
the constitutionality ofatax law, a court should put aside "theoretical distinctions" and
look to "the practical effect and operation" of the scheme.343
The Lunding II court further noted that
... in Shaffer the Court upheld a provision of the Oklahoma income tax law that taxed
nonresidents' income derived from local property and business and limited their
deductions to losses related to these in-State activities, where Oklahoma also taxed all
income of its own citizens. Similarly in Travis, the Court considered a New York
Statutory provision limiting a nonresident's income tax deductions to such as 'are
connected with income arising from sources within the state.' In upholding the
provision the Court noted that 'there is no constitutional discrimination against
citizens of other States in confining the deduction of expenses, losses, etc., in the case
77 TAX NOTES 509 (1997); Sheryl Stratton, IRS Suspends Four District-Level Managers, 77
TAX NOTES 8 (Oct. 6, 1997); George Guttman, Evaluating the IRS: The Senate Finance
Hearings in Retrospect, 77 TAX NOTEs 13, (Oct. 6, 1997).
340. Lunding II, 675 N.E.2d at 819 (internal quotes omitted).
341. Id. (citations omitted).
342. Id. (citations omitted).
343. Id. (quoting Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 56 (1920)).
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of nonresident taxpayers, to such as are connected with income arising from sources
within the taxing State, likewise is settled by [Shaffer]'. The Travis Court, however,
considered an additional provision of the Tax Law that disallowed nonresidents any
personal exemptions and found this an unreasonable discrimination because New
York's proffered hope of reciprocity did not justify the statute's discriminatory
effect?"
This analysis is flawed in that it fails to consider the fact that the Travis Court
was not dealing with deductions for personal expenses, but was merely stating
theoretical possiblilities, which did not exist at that time. The other major flaw
in this reliance is that tax law, unlike other areas of law, is a fast moving area
and the cases cited were considered more than seventy-five years ago, arising
shortly after the first income tax law was adopted in the United States. A
decision in the present atmosphere should rely more heavily on a reasoned
discussion of what would best serve society today. To rely on these old,
outdated cases is generally unacceptable. In fact, Shaffer has no relevance to
the issue in Lunding.345
The Lunding II court did discuss a more recent federal case. They
analyzed the Supreme Court holding in Austin v. New Hampshire.346 In Austin,
the Supreme Court
invalidated New Hampshire's commuters' income tax where it determined that 'the tax
falls exclusively on the income of nonresidents; and it is not offset even approximately
by other taxes imposed upon residents alone.' Indeed, the practical effect of the tax
scheme in Austin was that New Hampshire taxed only the income of nonresidents
working in the State, whereas its own residents paid no income tax whatsoever.347
This case has very little relevance to the Lunding facts. In fact, it stands for a
valid reason for finding the New York statute to be unconstitutional. The New
York statute falls more heavily upon nonresidents. A nonresident who earns
all of his income in New York would pay a higher tax than a resident of New
York who has the same alimony expense.
The court of appeals stated that as a result of their analysis of Shaffer,
Travis and Austin; "the Privileges and Immunities Clause does not mandate
absolute equality in tax treatment., 34" Relying on another U.S. Supreme Court
344. Id. at 819-20 (quoting Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 73, 75-76
(1920)).
345. See discussion in Sec. V.
346. 420 U.S. 656 (1975).
347. Lunding If, 675 N.E.2d 386 (quoting Austin, 420 U.S. at 665). But see, Spencer
v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 316 S.E.2d 386 (S.C. 1985). Affd by an equally divided
court, 471 U.S. 82 (1985) (stating that reciprocity between States is insufficientjustification for
disallowance of alimony deduction).
348. Lunding I, 675 N.E.2d at 820.
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case, Toomer v. Witsell,349 the court concluded "[r]ather, disparity in tax
treatment between residents and nonresidents is permissible 'in the many
situations where there are perfectly valid independent reasons for it."'"" The
test which the court derived from those cases was that "the Clause is not
violated where (i) there is a substantial reason for the difference in treatment;
and (ii) the discrimination practiced against nonresidents bears a substantial
relationship to the State's objective."35' In fact, most of the courts that have
applied these tests have determined that it applies only when the nonresidents
are the peculiar source of the evil at which the statute is aimed.352 There is no
evidence of evil in this case.353 All of the cases cited by the court of appeals
in defense of their holding shed very little light upon the Lunding situation.
Toomer involved discriminatory shrimp fishing rules, some involving
discriminatory taxes on nonresident fishermen.354 The court of appeals, in
LundingI, did not address any evil at which the New York discrimination was
aimed. In Spencer v. South Carolina Tax Commission,355 the Supreme Court
of South Carolina held that a statute which denied personal deductions to
nonresidents was violative of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. They
believed that the clause "was intended to prevent retaliation and to promote
federalism." '356
The Lunding II court went on to expound on how well settled the issue
was in New York. "In [New York] the propriety of disallowing deductions to
nonresidents for personal expense unrelated to New York income-producing
sources was definitively addressed in Matter of Goodwin v. State Tax
Comm 'n."357 This statement and reliance upon Goodwin presents the most
troubling aspect of the Lunding II decision.
This reliance upon Goodwin is a clear example of what happens when a
court, without sufficient information, blindly relies on what appears to be
''common law." This reliance on a case which was not overturned by the
courts, but was overturned by the governments and legislature of the states
involved, shows exactly where common law can fail the populace. Goodwin
caused a commission to be created and an agreement was reached between the
349. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
350. Lunding IL, 675 N.E.2d at 820 (quoting Toomer, 334 U.S. at 396).
351. Lunding I, 675 N.E.2d at 820 (quoting Supreme Court ofN.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S.
274, 284 (1985)).
352. See Toomer, 334 U.S. 385 (1948); See Spencer, 316 S.E.2d 386 (S.C. 1985).
353. See LundingI1, 675 N.E.2d at 818.
354. See Toomer, 334 U.S. at 403.
355. 316 S.E.2d 38 (S.C. 1985), affd by an equally divided court, 471 U.S. 82 (1985).
See supra note 364.
356. Spencer, 316 S.E.2d at 388.
357. 286 A.D. 694 (1955).
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states. But, the court of appeals, in Lunding 11, merely relies upon the holding
of Goodwin while completely ignoring the later history.
In Goodwin,
[t]he petitioner, a lawyer residing in New Jersey and practicing in New York City,
challenged New York's disallowance of deductions he claimed for his New Jersey real
estate taxes, interest payments, medical expenses and life insurance premiums.3"' In
upholding the challenged disallowance, the Appellate Division gave three independent
reasons to support the statute, two of which are [relevant] here.
First, New York residents-unlike nonresidents-were subject to the burden of
taxation on their worldwide income regardless of source and therefore were entitled
to the offsetting benefit of full deductions. Second, the court found it reasonable to
disallow the deductions because they were personal expenses of the taxpayer and
therefore 'clearly a part of the petitioner's personal activities in his home State... If
these expenditures are to be allowed as deductions at all, they should be allowed by
the State of the taxpayer's residence.' [The] Goodwin [court] justified the disparity on
the basis that deductions for certain personal expenses reflected acceptable State policy
'to give aid or encouragement of the character embodied in the tax deductions to its
own residents' where the policies were linked to residence, and in such instances the
State was not 'constitutionally required to extend similar aid or encouragement to the
residents of other States.'359
It seems that this analysis was driven by an adherence to the privileges and
immunities theories of Brainerd Currie which were discussed above.36 It must
be noted that most of these theories, that states must only look after their own
citizens and not care for citizens of other states, have been clearly refuted in
the period since the 1950s. 361
In Goodwin, under the theories applicable at the time, the court believed
that if they found unconstitutional, the portion of the New York tax law which
denies these personal deductions to nonresidents, that they would then have to
strike down the entire tax law which applied to nonresidents.3 62 This created
added pressure to uphold the statute based upon the Travis case. In addition,
the court felt that Travis had answered this exact question.
After Goodwin, the appellate division in Golden v. Tully363 considered a
privileges and immunities challenge to New York's policy of granting a
moving expenses deduction to residents while denying it to nonresidents. Only
358. At the period in question, New York State had enacted a law which denied
deduction of itemized federal amounts to nonresidents. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 360 (McKinney
1919).
359. Lunding II, 675 N.E.2d at 820 (quoting Goodwin v. State Tax Comm'n, 146
N.Y.S.2d at 172 (App.Div. 1955)) (citations omitted).
360. See supra note 164.
361. See Laycock, supra note 122, at 433-36.
362. See Goodwin, 146 N.Y.S.2d at 174.
363. 449 N.E.2d 406 (N.Y. 1983).
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nonresidence was the explanation for the disallowance.3" The appellate
division struck down the discriminatory statute, and was affirmed by the court
of appeals. In fact, most other states allow the nonresidents to deduct a
proportional amount of personal deductions.3 65
New York stands out again as the prime violator of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause and the type of protective spirit which the clause was meant
to protect against. In fact, New York has a specific statutory provision which
is meant to do the same thing.366 There have been a few other states which
have denied the deduction of personal expenses to nonresidents. 67 The most
common treatment by states has been the proportional allowance of the
personal deductions to nonresidents.368
The court of appeals, in Lunding II went further
Now applying well-established principles to the facts before us, we conclude there is
no violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The disparate tax treatment of
alimony paid by a nonresident is fully justified in light of the disparate treatment of
income: nonresidents are taxed only on income earned in New York, while residents
are taxed on all income earned from whatever sources. Focusing on the practical effect
and operation of the challenged tax it is clear that the advantage granted residents is
offset by the additional burden of being taxed on all sources of income.36 9
But, the nonresidents receive far less governmental services from New York.
The point that the court did not discuss is that the nonresidents earning their
living in New York are not placing a greater burden on the use of governmental
services in New York than are residents. They are, however, under these facts,
being taxed at a greater level than are residents. The most important single
point is that these nonrtsidents are paying more tax than residents who are
similarly situated.
The next portion of the Lunding II decision is also very troubling. The
court states, "Indeed, unlike Travis and Shaffer, nonresidents are not denied all
benefit of the alimony deduction since they can claim the full amount of such
payments in computing the hypothetical tax liability 'as if a resident' under
Tax Law § 601 (e).""37  Tax Law § 601 (e) provides that the nonresident's tax
364. See Golden, 449 N.E.2d at 406.
365. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 30 § 1126 (repealed by Del. Laws, c. 86 § 7 (1987));
HAW. REv. STAT. § 235-5(c) (1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 2362(4) (West 1997).
366. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 635 (McKinney 1997).
367. See Davis v. Franchise Tax Bd., 71 Cal. App. 3d 998 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); Stiles
v. Currie, 118 S.E.2d 4298 (N.C. 1961).
368. See Kuhnen v. Musolf, 420 N.W.2d 401 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988); Barney v. State Tax
Assessor, 490 A.2d 233 (Me. 1985); Taylor v. Conta, 316 N.W.2d 814 (Wis. 1981).
369. Lunding v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 675 N.E.2d 816, 821 (N.Y. 1996).
370. Lunding IA 675 N.E.2d at 821 (emphasis added).
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is computed as if the person were a resident.371 This includes any deductions
allowed to a resident, including alimony. This tax is then multiplied by the
"New York Source Fraction" to compute the taxpayer's tax liability. The
"New York Source Fraction" is the individual's federal adjusted gross income
as the denominator and the numerator being the individual's New York source
income.372 In the case where a nonresident taxpayer had all of their earnings
in New York, and paid alimony, the resulting fraction would be greater than
one.3 73 The nonresident taxpayer receives no benefit from this computation
other than allocating the New York portion of the tax.374 The court states that
the effect of the application of § 601(e) is "nonresidents are not denied all
benefit of the alimony deduction since they can claim the full amount of such
payments in computing hypothetical tax liability 'as if a resident' under Tax
Law § 601(e)." '375 This statement is true in some instances, and the effect is
generally very small. The only effect that the alimony deduction has is on the
denominator of the equation. It does not in any way decrease the tax of the
nonresident. This shows a profound misunderstanding by the court in its
analysis.
371. This allocation of deductions and exemptions has been approved as rational and fair
by many courts. See Reynolds Metals Co. v. Martin, 107 S.W.2d 252, 263 (Ky. Spec. Ct. App.
1937); Barney v. State Tax Assessor, 490 A.2d 223 (Me. 1985); Lung v. O'Chesky,617 P.2d
1317 (N.M. 1980).
372. See Brady v. State of New York, 607 N.E. 2d 1060, (N.Y. 1992), cert. denied. 509
U.S. 905 (1993)
373. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 63 1(a)(McKinney 1987). New York source income would
be all of the income of the taxpayer. Likewise, all of the income would be included in federal
adjusted gross income. But, federal adjusted gross income would have been reduced by the
amount of the alimony payment. This would result in a fraction greater than one. This
increased fraction would result in a modification of the amount computer "as if a resident" to
an amount virtually identical with the full tax on the nonresident without any reduction for
alimony payments. When the alimony paid by a nonresident is a large proportion of the payor's
income, the use of this calculation does provide some small amelioration. At higher levels of
income, and where the alimony paid is a small percentage of income, the benefit is very small.
It is not a rational adjustment. This analysis would be similar for nonresident income
percentages.
374. See id New York measures source income of a nonresident as:
the sum of the net amount of items of income, gain, loss, and deduction entering into
his federal adjusted gross income, as defined in the laws of the United States for the
taxable year, derived from or connected with New York sources, including:
(1) his distributive share of partnership income, gain, loss and deduction...
(2) items of income, gain, loss and deduction derived from or connected with New
York sources shall be those items attributable to...
(B) a Business trade, profession or occupation carried on in this state...
Id.
375. Lunding I1, 675 N.E.2d at 821.
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This is an example of what can occur when a complex tax statute is
analyzed by a court without the guidance of a tax expert. The taxpayer was not
a tax lawyer. The assistant attorney general was not a tax attorney, and the
court had no such expertise. However, the numerator of the fraction (referred
to as the "apportionment percentage")-the nonresident's New York source
income-, has under the Internal Revenue Code been reduced by any alimony
payments.376 Since the alimony deduction is not connected with either of these
figures, it has no effect upon the determination of the tax figure. The use of
this provision to explain the court's decision makes no sense. The court is
grasping at an issue which has no relevance to the case. The purpose of the
fraction referred to is simple, it is a method whereby nonresidents are made to
pay New York tax at the higher marginal rate which applies to all of their
income. If the marginal tax rate on New York income were applied to only
New York income, some taxpayers could be in a lower marginal tax bracket.
The court points to a provision which has the effect of raising taxes on most
nonresidents, but has a coincidental minimal ameliorating effect in this case,
as being a factor in the fairness of the tax treatment of these nonresidents. It
appears to be stretching an issue to its limits. The court of appeals held that
the disallowance is substantially justified by the fact that petitioner's alimony
payments are - not unlike the expenditures for life insurance, out-of-state
property taxes and medical treatment at issue in Goodwin - wholly linked to
personal activities outside the state. They believed there is nothing to "warrant
the petitioner's shifting the allowance for these expenditures, which are
intimately connected with the state of his residence, to New York state."377
The court felt that there can be no serious argument that petitioners' alimony
deductions are legitimate business expenses. Thus, they held that "the
approximate equality of tax treatment required by the Constitution is satisfied,
and greater fine-tuning in this tax scheme is not constitutionally mandated.
3 7
This analysis fails to look to the proper issue. The issue is not whether
alimony is a business expense, but whether it is related to the New York
income.
The taxpayers argued that the silence of TRARA's legislative history as
to the substantial reasons behind the treatment of nonresidents' alimony
deductions preordained its unconstitutionality. Although there is no legislative
history, the Department of Taxation has made their motives clear, they have
grabbed an opportunity, created by a liberalization of federal law, to increase
the taxation of a nonresident taxpayer. The court believed that there were
376. See I.R.C. § 215 (1986).
377. Goodwin v. State Tax Comm'n, 146 N.Y.S.2d 172, 180 (App. Div. 1955).
378. Lunding 11, 675 N.E.2d at 821.
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substantial reasons for the disparity in tax treatment, and that these reasons
were apparent on the face of the statutory scheme. Thus, the absence of a
statement at the time of enactment was not a sufficient reason to invalidate the
statute. What the New York court found to be apparent on the face of the
statute was not so apparent to the Oregon Supreme Court. They found that
there was a connection between generating income in one state and payment
of alimony in another.37 9 It is inconceivable that the court would not discuss
the differing opinion in the Oregon case.
The court of appeals also found against Lunding under the Equal
Protection and Commerce Clauses. They stated
Nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment prevents the States from imposing unequal
taxation on nonresidents, so long as the inequality is rationally related to the
furtherance of a legitimate State interest. Here, New York's treatment of alimony
deductions is rationally related to its substantial policy of taxing only those gains
realized and losses incurred by a nonresident in New York, while taxing residents on
all income from whatever sources. Further, the challenged treatment is rationally
related to its policy of limiting a nonresident's deductions to those attributable to
income-producing activities in New York. Even if this matter concerning alimony
payments were deemed to involve interstate commerce, petitioners' Commerce Clause
claim would ultimately fail for the same reason.3"'
This belief that the alimony payment is not related to the New York
income producing activities is severely flawed. The amount of the alimony
payment was determined with consideration of the New York income
producing activities. It is clearly related to the New York activities. The
belief also contradicts a recent holding by the Supreme Court of Oregon.3"'
The spouse was an "economic partner" of the taxpayer during the time of the
marriage.3"2 In this "economic partnership," certain rights were generated.
Those rights included the right to an alimony payment after the termination of
the marriage. The determination of that alimony payment was integrally
related to the earning of income in New York by the "economic partnership."
Therefore, when at a later date the alimony payment is made from New York
generated income, it is related to the New York income production. But, even
beyond this argument, and the determination in Lunding, the New York Court
379. See Wood v. Department of Revenue, 749 P.2d 1169 (Or. 1988). See infra notes
399-428 and accompanying text.
380. Lunding II, 675 N.E.2d at 821-22 (citations omitted).
381. See Wood, 749 P.2d at 1169.
382. Most courts have treated marriage as an economic partnership, but specifically, the
New York Court of Appeals in a series of opinions has characterized marriage as an economic
partnership. See Dejesus v. Dejesus. 687 N.E.2d 1319 (N.Y. 1997); Hartog v. Hartog, 647
N.E.2d 749 (N.Y. 1995); McSparron v. McSparron, N.E.2d 745 (N.Y. 1995).
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of Appeals is applying a test which is outdated, incorrect and divisive to the
taxation of nonresidents.
The reliance by the New York Court of Appeals on the Goodwin case
shows the mean spiritedness and cavalier attitude that state courts have taken
in their failure to protect nonresident taxpayers. It is the strongest argument
for litigating such issues in the federal court of the nonresident taxpayer's
domicile. This reliance upon Goodwin shows a clear lack of sympathy for
nonresidents. The Goodwin case stands as an ill considered beacon of
ignorance and the capabilities of states for an all out war on nonresidents. We
are now reaping the results of such thinking. The adoption by the Lunding
court of that opinion shows an interest in going to a contentious position
against the alien taxpayer, the nonresident. It manifests itself in the increasing
legislative attacks on nonresidents. This is resulting in exactly the type of
treatment of nonresidents from which the Privileges and Immunities Clause
was meant to protect against. The New York Court of Appeals has quite
aggressively told nonresidents that the New York legislature has a free hand
to abuse them.
A. Wood v. Department of Revenue383
In 1988, the Oregon Supreme Court decided an issue identical to the one
faced in New York in the Lunding case.384 It is surprising to the point of
dismay that the New York Court of Appeals, in Lunding II, although decided
eight years later, did not even mention the Oregon case. It would seem that a
court which is overruling a lower court in its own state, and ruling on a federal
constitutional issue would attempt to distinguish, or at least mention the
opposite ruling of a state supreme court in another state. Since the New York
Court of Appeals relied so heavily upon a lower court in New York, in the
Goodwin decision, it appears as though the court is completely discounting the
Oregon court. This would appear to be an act of elitism which cannot be
justified. The only other possible explanation is that the New York Court of
Appeals was unaware of the Oregon decision in Wood. If such is the case, then
it appears to be an unacceptable act of negligence. Since the taxpayer in
Lunding was not a tax attorney, it could be that he did not present the case to
the court. In a case involving apro se taxpayer, it would be expected that the
office of the Attorney General would have some duty to present the case to the
court. Being a case in the highest court of the state of Oregon, there is no
rational explanation for the New York court to have ignored it. It is another
383. 749 P.2d 1169 (Or. 1988).
384. See Wood, 749 P.2d at 1169.
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indiction of the lack of fairness that can be expected by a nonresident in
litigating a tax issue before the courts of the taxing state.
The issue in the Woodcase was "whether the disallowance of a deduction
for alimony to nonresidents of Oregon, when contrasted with the allowance of
a deduction for alimony to residents of Oregon ... violate[d] the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution.""3 5 No Oregon
constitutional issue was raised.386 The Oregon Tax Court ruled against Wood
on the constitutional question.387 The Oregon Supreme Court held that the
Oregon statute disallowing a deduction for alimony to nonresidents "violated
plaintiffs' claimed federal constitutional rights" and reversed the Oregon Tax
Court.388
Erskine B. Wood practiced law as a partner in a Portland firm. Wood
resided in Vancouver, Washington, and filed Oregon nonresident personal
income tax returns on his income earned in Oregon.3 9 "During the years in
question ... Wood made substantial alimony payments to two former wives,
who paid Oregon income tax on the alimony received."39 Wood paid $80,113
of alimony to these former wives who both resided in Oregon.39" ' "The parties
further stipulated that... Wood's present and future Oregon law practice
income was a major factor considered in determining the amount of alimony
that was agreed upon in the divorce decrees.
3 92
The Oregon court explained the law for the tax years at issue, "ORS
316.127(1)(a) did not permit a nonresident a deduction from Oregon income
for alimony because the alimony was not a 'deduction' in arriving at federal
adjusted gross income. '393 The narrow question before the Oregon court was
"whether the distinction between the tax treatment of alimony payments of
residents and nonresidents is an unconstitutional infringement on plaintiffs'
rights under the federal Privileges and Immunities Clause.
"394
385. Wood, 749 P.2d at 1169 (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 316.127(l)(A)(1995))(footnote
and citation omitted).
386. See id.
387. See Wood v. Department of Revenue, 10 Or. Tax 374 (1987).
388. See id.
389.
390. Id.
391. See id. at 1169, n.2.
392. Id.
393. Wood, 749 P.2d at 1170 (footnote omitted).
394. Id. See OR. REv. STAT. § 316.127 (1981). Oregon's statute provides:
(I)The adjusted gross income of a nonresident derived from sources within this state
is the sum of the following:
(a)The net income of items of income, gain, loss and deduction entering into his
federal adjusted income that are derived from or connected with sources in this state
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The court further explained the federal and state law concerning alimony
deductions
From 1942 until the passage of the federal 1976 Tax Reform Act, all taxpayers were
allowed to claim alimony as an itemized deduction on their federal tax returns. The
1942 Act provided that in computing net income there shall be allowable as
deductions alimony or separate maintenance payments made during the taxable year.
Since the adoption of Oregon's Personal Income Tax Act of 1969, the express intent
of the legislature has been that Oregon tax law will conform to federal tax law insofar
as possible. As part of the attempt to parallel federal tax law, Oregon residents and
nonresidents are allowed to take itemized deductions from adjusted gross income on
their Oregon tax returns similar to federal deductions.
In 1976, Congress passed the Tax Reform Act and made alimony an adjustment,
one of the items used to determine adjusted gross income, rather than an itemized
deduction subtracted after adjusted gross income is calculated. This change allowed
alimony-paying federal and Oregon resident taxpayers to take a full deduction for
alimony without itemizing deductions and still take the benefit of the standard
deduction. Some nonresident Oregon taxpayers were harmed by this change because,
while Oregon deductions are substantially the same as federal deductions,
nonresidents who paid Oregon income tax for the years in question could not use the
same adjustments to determine adjusted gross income. Oregon tax law allowed
nonresidents to adjust their income derived from sources within this state only if the
adjustments were attributable to the ownership or disposition of real or tangible
personal property in Oregon or attributable to a business, trade, profession or
occupation carried on in Oregon.395
The court assumed that Wood's income as a partner in his Portland law firm
had no relationship or attribution to his alimony payments.396
The court noted that over 100 years ago the United States Supreme Court
said
[Blut, it should not be forgotten that the people of the several states live under one
common constitution, which was ordained to establish justice, and which, with the
laws of Congress, . . . is the supreme law of the land; and that the supreme law
requires equality of burden, and forbids discrimination in state taxation when the
power is applied to the citizens of other states. Inequality of burden .... was one of
including (A) his distributive share of partnership income and deductions and (B) his
share of estate or trust income and deduction; and...
(2)Items of income, gain, loss and deduction derived from or connected with sources
within this state are those items attributable to:
(a)The ownership or disposition of any interest in real or tangible personal property
in this state; and(b)A business, trade, profession or occupation carried on in this state.
Wood 749 P.2d at 1170, n.3 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 316.127 (1981)).
395. Wood, 749 P.2d at 1170 (footnote and citations omitted); see also OR. REV. STAT.
§316.048 (1995).
396. See Wood, 749 P.2d at 1170.
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the grievances of the citizens under the Confederation; and the new constitution was
adopted, among other things, to remedy those defects in the prior system.397
Additionally the court noted that the Supreme Court has also held:
Like many other constitutional provisions, the privileges and immunities clause is not
an absolute. It does bar discrimination against citizens of other States where there is
no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are citizens
of other States. But it does not preclude disparity of treatment in the many situations
where there are perfectly valid independent reasons for it. Thus the inquiry in each
case must be concerned with whether such reasons do exist and whether the degree of
discrimination bears a close relation to them."'
Further, the Oregon Court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court had recently
restated this principle: "The [Privileges and Immunities] Clause does not
preclude discrimination against nonresidents where: (i) there is a substantial
reason for the difference in treatment; and (ii) the discrimination practices
against nonresidents bears a substantial relationship to the State's objective."3
The tax department argued that there are substantial reasons for the denial
to nonresidents of a deduction for alimony. The department asserted
(a) Nonresidents are only taxed on their Oregon source income, and alimony
expenditures are not connected with Oregon source income;
(b) Residence has an obvious connection with the allowance for the alimony
deduction, because the alimony obligation arises from activities in the state of
residence, which is the locus of the marriage; and
(c) The statute denying deductions for alimony was originally intended to deny
nonresidents those deductions for expenses associated with non-Oregon source
income.4
This was the same argument made by the New York Department of Taxation
in Lunding I. Because of a change in the federal tax law, the Oregon statute
denied to nonresidents the deduction for alimony, even though alimony is not
associated with the generation of non-Oregon source income.
397. Id. at 1171 (quoting Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 431 (1870)).
398. Id. (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948)).
399. Id. (quoting Supreme Ct. of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 284, (1985)) (alteration
in original); see also United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S.
208, 222 (1984).
400. Wood, 749 P.2d at 1171.
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The Supreme Court of Oregon held
The so-called reasons simply do not track. It is no reason for disparity to claim that
the income and alimony expenditures are not related to Oregon income, or to claim
that the out-of-state character of the obligation and the plaintiff's residence justify
such a distinction. Neither does the original intent of the Oregon legislation to 'deny
nonresidents those deductions for expenses associated with non-Oregon source
income' provide any substantial reasons for the unequal tax treatment, because, at the
department admits, the present denial does not correspond to the original intent of the
legislation.4"'
The State of Oregon conceded that the original intent of ORS § 316.127
was to deny nonresidents deductions for expenses associated with non-Oregon
source income, and not to deny nonresidents adjustments for alimony
payments.4 °2 The court concluded that there are less restrictive means to
achieve the original intent of the statute. "The state could achieve its original
intent and come closer to its stated policy of compatibility with the federal tax
law by, for example, stating that federal adjustments will be allowed unless
those adjustments are items of income, gain, loss or deduction derived from
non-Oregon source income.
' 40 3
The court emphasized that "[w]hen considering nonresident taxpayer
challenges under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, courts must look to the
practical effect of the taxing scheme, applying a 'rule of substantial equality
of treatment for the citizens of the taxing state and nonresident taxpayers.'41
The court pointed out that the state agrees that "[t]he practical effect of
Oregon's taxing scheme is to allow a resident to deduct alimony when
calculating his adjusted gross income, and to deny that deduction to a
nonresident. '40 5 The State attempted to justify this disparity by arguing:
"[a]lthough a resident is taxable by Oregon on the resident's entire income
from whatever source, a nonresident is taxable by Oregon on his Oregon
source income only. Thus, the denial of the alimony deduction does not
subject the nonresident to a higher tax than that imposed on a resident."4 6 This
argument was rejected by the court. "No matter how the tax is calculated, the
practical effect is still to discriminate against nonresident taxpayers for no
articulable substantial reason. The disallowance of the deduction subjects
401. Id. at 1171-72. The Oregon court pointed out that in Piper, the Supreme Court
noted that "[i]n deciding whether the discrimination bears a close or substantial relationship to
the State's objection, the Court has considered the availability of less restrictive means." Id. at
1172, n.5.
402. Id. at 1172, n.5.
403. Id.
404. Id. at 1172 (quoting Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 665 (1975)).
405. Wood, 749 P.2d at 1172.
406. Id.
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nonresidents to a higher tax relevant to alimony than imposed on residents. 0 7
The Oregon court found the federal law as expressed in Travis v. Yale &
Towne Manufacturing Co.,4"8 as dispositive of the case.
In Travis, the United States Supreme Court held hat a personal exemption
that discriminated on the basis of residency was unconstitutional
discrimination against nonresidents, stating
In the concrete, the particular discrimination is upon citizens of Connecticut and New
Jersey, neither of which states has an income tax law.., residents and citizens of
those states, go daily from their homes to the city and earn their livelihood there.
They pursue their several occupations side by side with residents of the state of New
York,-in effect competing with them as to wages, salaries, and other terms of
employment. Whether they must pay a tax upon the first $1,000 or $2,000 of income,
while their associates and competitors who reside in New York do not, makes a
substantial difference. Under the circumstances as disclose, we are unable to find
adequate ground for the discrimination, and are constrained to hold that it is an
unwarranted denial to the citizens of Connecticut and New Jersey of the privileges and
immunities enjoyed by citizens of New York.40 9
The 1920 Travis decision was approved relatively recently in Austin v. New
Hampshire,410" which cited Travis extensively, commenting: "The New York
tax on residents and non-residents' income at issue in Travis could not be
sustained when its actual effect was considered. The tax there granted
personal exemptions to each resident taxpayer but it made no similar provision
for non-residents. 41
The Oregon court noted in Wood that the "actual effect of the
department's interpretation is to grant a personal exemption (adjustment) for
alimony to residents, but no similar provision for nonresidents. Because
nonresidents cannot adjust their income to account for alimony payments,
nonresidents pay tax on a relatively larger portion of gross income than do
residents. 41
The court further explained that the Supreme Court's 1975 decision in
Austin, "warned that because nonresidents are not represented in the taxing
state's legislature, the Court has a 'heightened concern for the integrity of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause.1' 41 3 Austin mandates rigorous scrutiny of
407. Id.
408. 252 U.S. 60 (1920).
409. Wood, 749 P.2d at 1172 (quoting Travis, 252 U.S. at 80).
410. 420 U.S. 656 (1975).
411. Wood, 749 P.2d at 1172 (quoting Austin, 420 U.S. at 664-65).
412. Id. at 1173.
413. Id. at 1174 (quotingAustin, 420 U.S. at 663).
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state taxing schemes that burden nonresidents.1 4 The Supreme Court has said
that states may legislate different treatment for residents and nonresidents
when there is a strong reason of policy and a rational basis for the difference .41
However, the court concluded here that there is no substantial reason or
rational basis for the difference. The alimony deduction in Wood was denied
purely on the basis of nonresidence." 6
Clearly, the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Lunding is at
odds with the Oregon court's decision. The only difference appears to be that
the recipients of the alimony were residents of Oregon in the Woodcase, while
in Lunding, the recipient spouse was not a resident of New York. But,
certainly there are many instances in which those set of facts exist in New
York, Connecticut and New Jersey. The New York tax treatment of alimony
is a broad based discrimination aimed only at nonresidents.
The courts have espoused two views of the deduction of "personal
expenses" by nonresidents from another states income tax computation. In the
Lunding, Berry and Goodwin cases, the three courts espoused the view that
such expenses related to the nonresidents personal life and not related to the
production of income in the taxing state are not to be allowed as deductions.
This theory seems to be a reading of the Supreme Court's language in Travis.
But, the language in Travis was written in 1919, before any concept of
personal deductions existed, and is based on language which does not relate to
the holding in the case.
The second view, espoused in Wood and Austin is that the denial of these
personal deductions is merely a method for the taxing state to generate higher
taxes from nonresidents. This is a facial discrimination against the
nonresidents.
B. Alimony
It is interesting that neither the New York court in Lunding, nor the
Oregon court in Wood looked at the reasoning behind the granting of a
deduction for alimony paid to a former spouse. Everyone supposes that this
is somehow related to an income or compensatory scheme. There are two
important points to be made here. First, the federal deduction for alimony is
based simply upon fairness concepts. There is no hint that it has to do with
compensation. The deduction was adopted in the Revenue Act of 19424'7 as a
mitigation to effect a vast increase in the income tax rates. The tax rates were
414. Id.
415. See id. (quoting Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959)).
416. See Wood, 749 P.2d at 1174.
417. See Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, 56 Stat. 753 (1942).
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increased by a huge margin to pay for the war effort. It was recognized that
some people could be required to pay in excess of 100% of their income in the
form of alimony and income taxes. The solution was to allow a deduction for
alimony paid. The cost was that the recipient would include the alimony into
income. There were no compensatory thoughts involved. The second point
is that alimony is directly related to the income stream of the payor. The most
significant aspect of the determination of the amount of alimony to be paid is
the payor's income stream. Where does this come from in the case of a person
who is earning money in another state. It comes from that other state. The
money which has been generated to support a spouse and will continue to be
generated to support the now ex-spouse is coming from the same source state.
If the connection exists before the divorce, it continues to exist after the
divorce. If in fact the marriage is an economic partnership,"' then the amounts
received by the spouse paying alimony, are the proceeds from this economic
partnership received in the taxing state. To view the alimony payments as
having no relationship with the state in which the monies used for the payment
are earned in disingenuous at best. Alimony is based upon the earnings of the
payor spouse in both Connecticut and New Jersey." 9 The alimony received by
the recipient spouse is a portion of the earnings earned by the payor spouse.
Another significant problem with the New York statute is that it does not
distinguish between alimony payments made by a nonresident taxpayer to a
resident of New York. In this instance, New York state is taxing the same
income twice, with no relief for either party. In a metropolitan area as
integrated as New York, Connecticut and New Jersey, there can be many
instances of this occurrence. Under these circumstances, the tax is punitive
and unjustifiable in any case. For this reason alone, the New York statute is
unconstitutional because it treats these persons in a manner which places a
greater tax on a nonresident merely by reason of their nonresident status.
418. Most courts have treated marriage as an economic partnership, but specifically, the
New York Court of Appeals in a series of opinions has characterized marriage as an economic
partnership. See Dejesus v. Dejesus, 687 N.E.2d 1319 (N.Y. 1997); Hartog v. Hartog, 647
N.E.2d 749 (N.Y. 1995); McSparron v. McSparron 662 N.E.2d 745 (N.Y. 1995).
419. Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23; Gugliotta v. Gugliotta, 388 A.2d 1338 (N.J.
Super Ct. Ch. Div. 1978), affid. 395 A.2d 901 (1978); O'Neill v. O'Neill, 12 A.2d 839 (N.J.
1940); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1982), with CONN. GEN. STAT. §
46b-82 (1995); Vandal v. Vandal, 626 A.2d 784 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993); Silver v. Silver, 365
A.2d 1188 (1976).
1999]
Law Review
VII. LUNDING IN THE SUPREME COURT
On January 21, 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion in the
Lunding case.4 2' The Court reversed the decision of the New York Court of
Appeals. 42' The most substantial rationale for the reversal was the Supreme
Court's belief thatNew York had not shown a "substantial justification" for the
discrimination.422 The Court again stated its test as one requiring that a state
must show: (1) there is a substantial reason for the difference in tax treatment
of nonresidents, and (2) the discrimination practiced against nonresidents bears
a substantial relationship to the state's objective.423 In applying the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution, the Court held that
New York had not adequately justified the discriminatory treatment of
nonresident individuals. The Court stated that they granted certiorari to
Lunding because the New York Court of Appeals case was in direct conflict
with Wood, and in tension with Spencer.424
The Lunding court restated their belief in the purpose of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause as: "placing the citizens of each State upon the same
footing with the citizens of other States, so far as the advantages resulting from
those States are concerned. ' 425 They restated other issues with respect to the
Clause as to the protection from unequal taxation afforded to nonresidents of
a state. They recognized that "absolute equality is impracticable." 426 The
Court also restates its rule in this area of one of "substantial equality of
treatment."
427
The specific areas of the Court's holding, and their discussion of the
reasons for overturning the New York Court of Appeals were the following:
(1) There was no substantial reason for the difference in treatment of New
York nonresidents; 428
(2) The court of appeals failed to take into account the history of the tax
statute, specifically the fact that the state tax statutes were completely rewritten
many years after Goodwin;429
420. See Lunding v. New York Tax Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287 (1998).
421. See Lunding, 118 S. Ct. at 752.
422. See id. at 773.
423. See id. at 772-73.
424. See id. at 773.
425. Id. at 773 (quoting Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1869)).
426. See Lunding, 118 S.Ct at 774.
427. Id. at 774.
428. See id. at 777.
429. See id.
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(3) The court of appeals was wrong in believing that the "as if'
computation applied to nonresident New York taxpayers could alleviate the
denial of the alimony deduction;430 and
(4) In relying on the belief that "there can be no serious argument that
petitioners' alimony deductions are legitimate business expenses," the court
of appeals applied an incorrect test for constitutional legitimacy.43'
Ultimately, the Court concluded that requiring nonresidents to pay more
tax than similarly situated residents, solely on the basis of whether or not
nonresidents are liable for alimony payments, violates the rule of "substantial
equality of treatment," described first by the Supreme Court in Travis. The test
which the Supreme Court applies is that any tax provision imposing
discriminatory treatment on nonresident individuals "must be reasonable in
effect and based on a substantial justification other than the fact of
nonresidence. ,432
The "substantial justification" test remains murky. It would seem
impossible to have a "substantial justification." In virtually every case, the
single reason for the difference in taxation of nonresidents has been to collect
more taxes from a group who cannot effectively complain. The
discriminations practiced are based solely on a motive to raise taxes on
nonresidents. The act of finding a rationale does not rise to a "substantial"
justification. If a person makes most or all of their income in one state, and
lives in another state, there can exist no justification for taxing that person
higher than the person residing in the taxing state. The economic dislocation
is not justifiable.
The three judges dissenting in Lunding adopted the reasoning of the New
York Court of Appeals, stating that alimony payments are "surely a personal
matter. '433 Under this analysis, the judges would not allow nonresidents any
deductions for matters not related to generating income in the taxing state.
This line of thinking appears to allow virtually all discrimination against
nonresidents. It would allow states to deny all "personal" deductions for
nonresidents. Ultimately, this would allow states to increase the tax burden on
nonresidents. Furthermore, it would significantly increase the cost of traveling
across state lines to obtain employment, and would result in increased
economic costs and dislocations. The dissent trivialized these results. In fact,
the argument was made that the resulting tax increase to some taxpayers was
430. See id. at 771 (The Supreme court pointed out that this exact calculation can create
a fraction in excess of 100%, thereby requiring the nonresident to pay more tax than the resident
taxpayer).
431. See Lunding, 118 S. Ct. at 781-82.
432. Id. at 782.
433. Id. at 783 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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insignificant.434 This again, reflects the cavalier attitude that many courts have
taken towards discriminatory taxation.
Clearly, the New York Court of Appeals issued a very flawed opinion in
Lunding. This opinion illuminates the lack of consideration given to
nonresidents. It shows a lack of consideration given to the decisions of the
supreme courts of other states such as the Wood decision. It illustrates how an
inattentive legislature can create a statute which is clearly unconstitutional, yet
is given a presumption of constitutionality, without giving any consideration
or explanation for its discriminatory policy.435 The Court gave no
consideration to the history of the statutes. The whole saga cost the State large
sums to litigate. And, a substantial number of taxpayers were left with no
remedy for the unconstitutional position taken by the legislature since 1987.
The statute of limitations only allows refunds for taxable years beginning in
1994 and later.436
CONCLUSION
Legislatures, in search of new revenue sources, and extremely wary of
unruly constituents, have turned their taxing power towards the helpless, the
non-constituent. The resulting taxes are becoming more discriminatory and
aggressive. The non-constituents generally cannot wield the necessary
economic power to force the repeal of these taxes. Legislatures have no
interest in protecting a class of people who cannot vote against them. The state
courts have shown a shocking indifference to the plight of the nonresident
taxpayer. The resulting taxes threaten the economic well being of interstate
commerce. The threat is greatest to the increasing number of people who
commute to another state to seek employment. But, it also exists for those
individuals and businesses who travel to another state to carry on business and
must rent cars and hotel rooms. In addition, travelers to another state will be
subject to discriminatory taxes aimed at nonresidents. The Constitution
provides adequate remedies in the privileges and immunities clause and the
equal protection clause. It is up to the federal courts to provide the
constitutional protection for the nonresident taxpayers. It appears that the state
courts are unlikely to provide protection to nonresidents. The most likely
success will be to avoid the traditional route of appeal through the state courts,
and go directly to the federal courts with a constitutional challenge. The
Supreme Court's decision in Lunding provides an opportunity to expand upon
434. See id. at 754 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
435. See James Dao, "Rank and File ofAlbany Chafing at Their Bit Parts, "N.Y. TIMEs,
Jan. 3, 1998, at Al (describing the inattentiveness given by the legislature to legislative
matters).
436. N.Y. TAX LAW § § 681(c), 683(a), 687(a)(McKinney 1987).
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the "substantial justification requirement." The clearest argument should be
that there can never be a substantial justification for the discriminatory tax.
It seems that the purpose of the Privileges and Immunities Clause was to
ensure that other states treated nonresidents fairly, that these nonresidents
receive the same protection afforded a resident. In addition, the Clause is
meant to guarantee the ability of a citizen of the United States to seek his or
her earnings in any state without interference from one state. The types of
trade barriers common in trade amongst countries are to be avoided between
states. The courts must be vigilant in protecting citizens from these increased
costs imposed on nonresidents by some states. The reality is that subterfuge
and complexity, either with knowledge or by operation, are used to conceal the
discriminatory taxes to the greatest extent possible. The federal courts appear
to be the only place that a citizen can gain protection from discriminatory state
taxation. The state courts have been protective of their statutes. What is
occurring now is exactly what the Constitution sought to prevent-the
beginning of trade wars, in the form of taxation, by individual states against
the citizens of other states.
There is adequate history and movement in the interpretation of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause to support a stronger stance against facial
discrimination by one state against the citizens of another state. In addition,
the possible economic dislocations, inefficiencies and disincentives possible
in discriminatory taxing schemes should be avoided. The courts need to apply
a more broadly based test of discrimination with respect to taxation of
nonresidents by any state. If the practical effect of a tax is to discriminate
substantially against a broad based class of nonresidents, and if it has no
specific rationale, designed to attack a peculiar source of evil, which explains
its discrimination, then it should be struck down. The specific rationale could
only be some specific matter of increased state expenses generated by the class
of taxpayers upon whom the tax is imposed. There have been very few
instances in which a state enacted a discriminatory tax with any other purpose
than to tax non-constituents at higher rates. The reasons attached to
construction of facilities break down to selfish reasoning of the taxing state.
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